Unsolicited sending of absent voter ballot applications; The right to vote by absentee ballot without a reason; Const. 1963, art. 2, § 4; Separation of powers; Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2; Interpretation of constitutional provisions; League of Women Voters of MI v. Secretary of State (League of Women Voters I & II); Statutory interpretation; Sau-Tuk Indus., Inc. v. Allegan Cnty.; Detroit Pub. Schs. v. Conn; Universal Underwriters Ins. Group v. Auto Club Ins. Ass’n; Principle that all political power is inherent in the people; Const. 1963, art. 1, § 1; The Secretary of State’s powers & duties in elections; Const. 1963, art. 5, § 3; The Michigan Election Law (MCL 168.1 et seq.); MCL 168.21; Citizens Protecting MI’s Constitution v. Secretary of State; Principle that local election officials must follow the Secretary of State’s instructions on the conduct of elections; MCL 168.31 & 32; Hare v. Berrien Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs; Applying for an absent voter ballot; MCL 168.759; Distinguishing Taylor v. Currie; Preserving the purity of elections; Elliott v. Secretary of State; Wells v. Kent Cnty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs; Expressio unius est exclusio alterius; “May”; Walters v. Nadell; Browder v. International Fid. Ins. Co.

Holding that defendant-Secretary of State did not abuse her discretion by sending absent voter ballot applications to registered Michigan voters, the court affirmed the Court of Claims’ grant of summary disposition for defendant and dismissal of plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff challenged defendant’s unsolicited sending of absent voter ballot applications to registered Michigan voters by mail before the 8/4/20 primary election and 11/3/20 general election, with a letter encouraging “absentee voting from home to stay safe in relation to the COVID-19 outbreak.” He alleged defendant lacked authority under state law and the constitution and violated the constitutional requirement of the separation of powers. “He sought to enjoin defendant from mass mailing unsolicited absent voter ballot applications to registered voters in Michigan.” The Court of Claims found defendant had authority to send the absent voter ballot applications at issue. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that defendant lacked the authority to send the applications. Defendant’s “action in sending an application which each registered voter was free to fill out and return, or not, fell within her authority as chief elections officer of the state, and comported with her constitutional obligation to liberally construe Const. 1963, art. 2, § 4(1) to effectuate its purposes.” Further, nothing in MCL 168.21 and MCL 168.31 “prohibits the Secretary of State from sending absent voter ballot applications to qualified registered voters” and “by furnishing the applications, the Secretary of State furthered the purposes of informing qualified registered voters of their right to vote by absentee ballot and facilitated their first step of applying for an absentee ballot to enable them to exercise their constitutional rights if they so choose.” The court disagreed with the dissent based on “the specific language of the statute, in conjunction with the constitutional and statutory duties of the Secretary of State and the specific language of the Const. 1963, art. 2, § 4(1) (g) and (h) and (2)[.]”