Trip & fall on uneven pavement; Immunity under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (MCL 691.1401 et seq.); Exceptions; MCL 691.1407(1); Johnson-McIntosh v. Detroit; Duty to maintain a sidewalk in reasonable repair; MCL 691.1402a(1); “Municipal corporation”; MCL 691.1401(d); Open & obvious defense; MCL 691.1402a(5); Buhl v. Oak Park; Price v. Kroger Co.; Premises liability; Buhalis v. Trinity Continuing Care Servs.; “Special aspects”; Hoffner v. Lanctoe; Weakley v. Dearborn Hts.; Lugo v. Ameritech Corp.; Principle that whether a statute is fair is not a proper consideration for the court; Ambs v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Rd. Comm’n; Brickey v. McCarver

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting defendant-city’s motion for summary disposition of plaintiff’s claim under the open and obvious doctrine. She sued defendant for injuries she sustained when she tripped and fell on uneven pavement. Defendant claimed it was entitled to summary disposition because the uneven sidewalk was open and obvious and no special aspects existed. Plaintiff responded that the open and obvious doctrine was not an applicable defense to defendant’s statutory duty to maintain the sidewalk. On appeal, the court rejected plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for summary disposition because the sidewalk was unreasonably dangerous. “[T]he risk presented by the raised slab of sidewalk was the risk of falling a short distance to the ground.” The court could not “conclude that the sidewalk posed an unreasonable risk of harm as that term of art has been decided in our case law.” Rather than the “30-foot open pit conjured up by our Supreme Court in Lugo, here, the record reveals that the sidewalk presented a typical hazard that is commonly confronted.” The court also rejected her claim that the trial court erred because its holding was tantamount to a negation of the duty to maintain public sidewalks in a condition safe for public travel, noting that “appellate courts wading into the waters of the ‘fairness’ of statutory language is no longer in vogue.” It is for the Legislature “‘to address the policymaking considerations that are inherent in statutory lawmaking.’” As noted by the trial court, “today’s judges are bound to follow this creed: ‘where the language of a statue is clear, it is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess a legislative policy choice; a court’s constitutional obligation is to interpret, not rewrite, the law.’” Affirmed.