Negligence & breach of contract claims; Res judicata; Adair v. Michigan; The “transactional” test; Washington v. Sinai Hosp. of Greater Detroit; Defamation; Ghanam v. Does; Kefgen v. Davidson; Smith v. Fergan; Qualified privilege as to communications on matters of shared interest between parties; 360 Constr. Co., Inc. v. Atsalis Bros. Painting Co. (ED MI); Timmis v. Bennett; Prysak v. R L Polk Co.; Unsworn statements; Liparoto Constr., Inc. v. General Shale Brink, Inc.

The court held that the circuit court erred in granting plaintiff-condo association and third-party defendants summary disposition as to defendant/third-party plaintiff’s (Garland) claims for negligence and breach of contract based on res judicata. However, it properly granted third-party defendants summary disposition on his defamation claim. In the circuit court case, Garland’s claims for breach of contract and negligence against the association and third-party defendant-Highlander “were premised on those parties’ alleged failure to perform required repairs and maintenance on the building that housed his unit, which Garland alleged resulted in him being displaced from the unit and suffering damages. The association’s complaint in the district court, on the other hand, was based on” his forfeiture of the land contract by virtue of failing to make his payments as required on the contract, and also on his “failure to abide by certain bylaws, including illegally parking his boat. These claims involve different, tenuously related facts, and would not have formed a convenient trial unit.” His additional contract claim was based on the allegation that third-party defendant-Cornak “had made an oral promise to allow Garland to perform work on his carport to turn it into an enclosed unit (so that it would be suitable to store his boat), but that Cornak, Highlander, and [third-party defendant-] Sigler had not authorized or permitted Garland to perform the work. Although the existence of such a promise was arguably relevant to whether Garland had breached the association’s bylaws, the breach of that alleged promise arose out of an entirely different transaction than the association’s claims” as to his forfeiture under the land contract. Thus, the facts underlying his claims in the circuit court case “did not arise out of the same transaction or set of operative facts as the facts underlying the association’s claims in the district court.” As to the defamation claim, third-party defendants asserted a qualified privilege, and the only “evidence” Garland offered in response to their summary disposition motion was an affidavit that was “not signed under oath or notarized.” Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.