Sentencing; The trial court’s authority at a resentencing for first-degree murder pursuant to MCL 769.25a & Miller v Alabama to consider defendant’s arguments as to his armed robbery & kidnapping sentences; People v. Turner; Whether a trial court must consider the “distinctive attributes of youth” such as those discussed in Miller where the prosecution does not seek a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP)

In an order in lieu of granting defendant leave to appeal as cross-appellant, the court reversed part of the Court of Appeals judgment (see e-Journal # 67375 in the 3/12/18 edition for the published opinion), holding that the trial court had authority at his resentencing for his first-degree murder conviction pursuant to MCL 769.25a and Miller to consider his arguments about his armed robbery and kidnapping sentences. It disagreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that these arguments were beyond the scope of his appeal. The court remanded the case to the trial court to consider his arguments as to the validity of his robbery and kidnapping sentences and to “exercise its discretion to resentence him for those convictions, in particular ‘if it finds that the sentence[s] [were] based on a legal misconception that the defendant was required to serve a mandatory sentence of life without parole on the greater offense.’” The court denied the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal because it was not persuaded that it should review the question presented.

Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Markman (joined by Justice Zahra) agreed with the decision to reverse the part of the Court of Appeals judgment addressing defendant’s arguments on his armed robbery and kidnapping sentences and to remand to the trial court for consideration of whether to resentence him for those convictions. But they dissented from the decision to deny the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal, which argued “that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the trial court must consider the ‘distinctive attributes of youth, such as those discussed in’” Miller where the prosecution is not seeking a LWOP sentence. They would have granted leave to appeal because they were inclined to agree with the prosecution, “and because there are significant consequences for our juvenile justice system[.]”

Concurring in the order to deny the prosecution leave to appeal, Justice Clement concluded that “the Court of Appeals decision below stands for the unremarkable principle that traditional penological goals should guide a trial court’s sentencing discretion and that the age of a particular defendant may affect the analysis of those traditional penological goals.” She respectfully disagreed with the prosecution and the dissenting-in-part justices that the holding represented an extension of Miller “into term-of-years resentencing under MCL 769.25(4) and MCL 769.25a(4)(c).”