Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i), (g), & (j); Substance abuse; In re LaFrance Minors; Failure to comply with a service plan; In re White; Children’s best interests; MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts Minors; Reasonable reunification efforts; In re Frey; In re TK; Ineffective assistance of counsel; In re Martin; The trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the children; MCL 712A.2(b)(2)

The court held that §§ (c)(i), (g), and (j) supported termination of respondents-parents’ parental rights, and that the trial court did not err in finding it was in the children’s best interests. Further, the DHHS made reasonable reunification efforts, and there was no merit to their ineffective assistance of counsel claims or their challenge to the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the children. As to § (c)(i), the evidence supported the finding that respondents failed to rectify the conditions leading to adjudication. There was evidence that they did not “participate in the children’s medical and educational services, despite having an opportunity to do so. The children’s treatment providers testified about the children’s medical conditions, their autism, their serious developmental delays, and the extensive medical, educational, and emotional support services they required in order to progress. Respondents did little to nothing to address these issues before the children entered care, and apart from completing a general parenting class, neither respondent meaningfully participated in other services to allow them to address the children’s special needs.” While they asserted they were not timely notified of the appointments, the caseworker contradicted this. There also was no evidence they seriously tried "to otherwise become involved and engaged in the children’s treatments.” In addition, while their substance abuse was more relevant to the analysis of §§ (g) and (j), the trial court did not clearly err in “finding that substance abuse remained a barrier to reunification . . . .” The court also concluded that it “did not clearly err when it found that these conditions would not be rectified within a reasonable time. Respondents had made minimal progress during the 16-month period the children had been in foster care.” As to the children’s best interests, trauma assessments after their removal showed they “had suffered from trauma and had significant developmental delays.” One child’s therapist testified about the child’s strides in foster care. She “was well adjusted to her foster home, knew the routine, and seemed very satisfied in her day-to-day activities.” The other child’s therapist testified that his “behaviors had also improved in foster care” and he seemed bonded with his foster parents. Affirmed.