Restoration of firearm rights; MCL 750.224f; MCL 28.424; Effect of the federal felon in possession (FIP) statute (18 USC § 922(g)); The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2); Preemption; Ter Beek v. Wyoming; The Gun Control Act (18 USC § 921 et seq.); § 927; § 921(a)(20); Unlawfully driving away an automobile (UDAA)

Holding that the federal FIP statute (§ 922(g)) does not preempt restoration of firearm rights to felons under Michigan law, the court vacated the part of the circuit court’s order that limited the restoration of petitioner’s firearm rights, and remanded. He petitioned for restoration under MCL 28.424 after having been convicted of UDAA. While the circuit court determined by clear and convincing evidence that he met all the requirements, it concluded that its authority to restore his firearm rights was limited by § 922(g). As a result, it found that the restoration of his “rights was limited to arms that were excluded from the definition of firearm used in” that statute, and entered an order granting petitioner’s request “but limited his right of possession to pellet guns, muzzle loaders, and black powder guns that do not take a modern cartridge.” He argued that it erred in so limiting his rights because “MCL 750.224f and MCL 28.424 provide for complete relief from criminal liability under Michigan’s” FIP statute, regardless of potential liability under § 922(g). The court agreed. It first noted that “UDAA is not a specified felony under MCL 750.224(f)(10),” and as a result, petitioner’s “right to possess a firearm under Michigan law was restored by operation of law three years after he paid his fines and completed the terms of his probation.” But he nonetheless sought authorization under MCL 28.424. The court found that if the circuit court thought it would be unwise to fully restore his rights given that he could still be convicted under § 922(g), this concern was “irrelevant because MCL 28.424(4) requires the court to restore the petitioner’s firearm rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the statute’s requirements were met, as was the case here.” If it found that the Michigan statutes were preempted by the federal statute, the court concluded that it erred. Considering whether the “restoration of firearm rights to felons under Michigan law is in ‘direct and positive conflict’ with” § 922(g), the court held that it was not, given that the Michigan statutes do not interfere with the federal government’s ability to enforce § 922(g) “or require, authorize, or excuse its violation.” Further, regardless of whether a state’s restoration of rights satisfies the exception in § 921(a)(20), “Congress clearly contemplated that states have that authority, notwithstanding the federal liability a felon may face under” § 922(g).