Sufficiency of the evidence for a CSC I conviction under MCL 750.520b(1)(a); “Sexual penetration”; MCL 750.520a(r); Sexual penetration of a genital opening; People v Lockett; Sentencing; Reasonableness challenge; Effect of a within guidelines sentence; MCL 769.34(10); Effect of defendant’s age; People v Lemons; Court costs; MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii)(A)-(C); Factual basis; People v Posey

Holding that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s CSC I conviction on count 5 for engaging in a sexual act that involved entry of his penis into the victim’s (A) genital opening, the court affirmed. It also rejected his reasonableness challenge to his within-guidelines 45-year minimum sentences, and found that remand was unnecessary as to the imposition of $1.300 in court costs. He was convicted of 13 counts of CSC I under MCL 750.520b(1)(a) and a count of child sexually abusive activity, but only challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to one of the CSC I convictions, count 5. A testified “that, on one occasion, defendant ‘rubbed’ his private part on the part of her body ‘where the pee comes out,’ and that ‘[i]t hurt.’” The court concluded that, viewing her “testimony in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a jury could have reasonably inferred that defendant’s penis intruded, however slightly, into [her] labia majora or vagina, which is sufficient to satisfy the ‘sexual penetration’ requirement of the statute.” While he asserted that the evidence was insufficient because there was “no DNA” corroborating penetration, pursuant to MCL 750.520h, a victim’s testimony “need not be corroborated in prosecutions under sections 520b to 520g.” As to defendant’s claim that his 45-year minimum sentences were disproportionate and unreasonable, they were within his applicable guidelines range of 171 to 570 months and thus, “may not be reviewed for reasonableness.” Further, he did not argue that there was an error in calculating his guidelines range or show “that the trial court relied on inaccurate information.” His contention that his minimum sentences were disproportionate based on his age (he was 33 years old when sentenced) “and that he will be at least 78 years old when he is eligible for parole” failed, as the court noted that a “trial court is not required to consider a defendant’s age in determining the proportionality of a sentence.” Finally, while the trial court did not provide a factual basis for the court costs it imposed, in light of Posey, the court concluded “that the assessment of $1,300 in court costs in this Wayne County Circuit case is consistent with the average cost of processing a case in that jurisdiction.”