Hearsay; MRE 801(c); A statement offered to show why police officers acted as they did; People v Chambers; Right of confrontation; Admission of a lab report; MCR 6.202(C)(1) & (2); Sentencing; Enhancement under MCL 333.7413(1) (second or subsequent drug offense); Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to make a futile objection; Confidential informant (CI)

Holding that the challenged statements by a police officer were not hearsay, and that defendant was not denied his right to confrontation by admission of a lab report, the court affirmed his delivery of meth conviction. It also affirmed his 12 to 40-year sentence for a second or subsequent drug offense, concluding that it was “clear that the trial court did not mistakenly believe that the sentence enhancement was mandatory.” Finally, his ineffective assistance of counsel claims also failed. The three statements he challenged “were that: (1) officers had received tips that defendant was selling narcotics and that the CI could purchase meth from defendant; (2) the CI initially stated that he could purchase marijuana from defendant and then that he could purchase meth; and (3) that the [CI] contacted the officer and stated that he could purchase meth from defendant. In other words, all three statements generally were to the same effect. Critically, they were all made in the context of explaining the background to why and how the officers decided to set up the controlled purchase. Considering the statements in the context of the prosecutor’s questions, they were clearly not offered to prove that defendant was selling narcotics. Rather, they were offered to explain why the officers attempted to make a controlled buy from defendant.” The court has held that such statements are not hearsay. As to the lab report, the prosecution gave defendant proper notice of its intention to use it “at trial pursuant to MCR 6.202(C)(1), and defendant made no written objection to the report pursuant to MCR 6.202(C)(2). Thus, the report was ‘admissible in evidence to the same effect as if the person who performed the analysis or examination had personally testified.’” The court added that, even if admitting it “had been erroneous, which it was not, defendant suffered no prejudice as a result.” He could not have been surprised by it given that he was properly notified and received a copy of the report over two months before trial, and the jury was already aware from testimony that the substance was field-tested and found to be meth. Lastly, the trial court explained on remand that it knew the MCL 333.7413(1) enhancement was discretionary and that it exercised its discretion in imposing it due to “defendant’s extensive criminal history and pattern of reoffending in the same manner.”