Motion for a directed verdict on a first-degree premeditated murder charge; People v Aldrich; People v Bass; Prosecutorial misconduct; People v Dobek; Measuring provocation for voluntary manslaughter under the “reasonable person standard”; People v Sullivan; Admission of a photo of the crime scene; Relevance; MRE 401-402; MRE 403; Unfair prejudice; People v Anderson

Concluding that the prosecution offered sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find the essential elements of first-degree murder were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. While it found that the prosecutor’s challenged comments as to the reasonable person standard were improper, it held that they did not merit reversal. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting a photo that showed the crime scene. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, felonious assault, domestic violence, and felony-firearm. He argued that because his anger was directed at his ex-girlfriend (S), there was no premeditation shown as to the victim, S’s best friend. But the evidence revealed “that defendant had emotional instability and was jealous of males that [S] would talk with, that defendant was highly upset that [S] was with the victim a few hours after she and defendant broke up, that defendant pulled [S] out of the car to yell at her for being with the victim, and that” he returned to his home to get his gun. The testimony also showed that he ran up behind S, pointed the gun at her, but did not shoot and then ran to the back of the car. In addition, he allowed S and the other friend to get in the car and he “waited for the victim to come outside to enter the car. It was not until the victim entered the driver’s seat that defendant came up to the driver’s-side window to initiate shooting. All this evidence taken together could establish that defendant intentionally waited for the victim to enter the car, that [he] thought about what he would do once the victim entered the car, and that [he] deliberated his choice to wait for the victim.” The court concluded that the prosecutor’s “remarks about the jurors themselves being the reasonable person appears to be error. Such remarks may have injected into each juror the responsibility to decide whether” he or she would have killed the victim, and if they would not, then they “could not convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter.” But pursuant to the trial court’s instructions, it was presumed “the jury correctly applied the reasonable person standard instead of injecting itself into the role of defendant when it” found inadequate provocation. In addition, overwhelming evidence suggested premeditation and deliberation. Affirmed.