The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA); Whether 15 USC § 1692f(8) contains a “benign language” exception; Strand v. Diversified Collection Serv., Inc. (8th Cir.); Goswami v. American Collections Enter., Inc. (5th Cir.); Preston v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc. (7th Cir.); Statutory interpretation; Avoiding absurd results; Ambiguity; Standing; Macy v. GC Servs. LP; Risk of public disclosure of status as a purported debtor; Douglass v. Convergent Outsourcing (3d Cir.)

In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court held that the plain text of FDCPA § 1692f(8) forecloses a “benign language” exception, and it concluded that plaintiff-Donovan plausibly alleged that defendant-FirstCredit’s debt-collection letter violated the provision. Thus, it reversed the district court’s order granting FirstCredit judgment on the pleadings. FirstCredit sent Donovan a letter demanding payment of a purported medical debt. Her name and address were visible through one of the envelope’s glassine window, and through the other, a checkbox could be seen with the words, “Payment in full is enclosed” and sometimes the phrase, “‘I need to discuss this further. My phone number is _______,’ is visible directly below the first.” She sued under § 1692f(8), which limits the amount of information a debt collector may use on an envelope when communicating with a consumer through the mail. The court first found that she had standing, concluding that her “allegation that FirstCredit violated § 1692f(8) ‘is sufficient in and of itself to constitute concrete injury’ without the further allegation of an ‘additional harm beyond the one Congress has identified.’” As to the merits, FirstCredit argued that § 1692f(8) contains a “benign language” exception that applied here. Donovan asserted that it does not contain such an exception. There is a split among circuits on this issue. The district court followed the line of cases supporting the exception interpretation. The court agreed with the Seventh Circuit’s contrary conclusion, holding that § 1692f(8)’s “plain text … forecloses a ‘benign language’ exception.” It rejected FirstCredit’s absurd-result argument, concluding that the “provision’s blanket prohibition is best understood as forbidding ‘any language or symbol’ on the envelope other than ‘language or symbols to ensure the successful delivery of the communication[.]’” The court found that the symbols and the language on FirstCredit’s envelope “played no role in ensuring the successful delivery of the letter, nor were they FirstCredit’s address or an allowable business name.” Thus, under the plain text of the statute, the allegations in Donovan’s complaint stated a claim. Remanded.