Search & seizure; Whether “when the police obtain a warrant to search digital data from a cell phone for evidence of a crime, they are later permitted to review that same data for evidence of another crime without obtaining a second warrant”; Riley v California; Fourth Amendment’s text; Reasonableness; Expectation of privacy; Scope of the warrant; “Particularity” requirement; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object under the Fourth Amendment to the admission of the evidence obtained from defendant’s cell-phone data

The court held that “a warrant to search a suspect’s digital cell-phone data for evidence of one crime does not enable a search of that same data for evidence of another crime without obtaining a second warrant.” It determined that “as with any other search, an officer must limit a search of digital data from a cell phone in a manner reasonably directed to uncover evidence of the criminal activity alleged in the warrant.” Thus, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court to address whether defendant was entitled to relief based upon the ineffective assistance of counsel. The court held that in light of the particularity requirement embodied in the Fourth Amendment and given meaning in Riley, “a search of digital cell-phone data pursuant to a warrant must be reasonably directed at obtaining evidence relevant to the criminal activity alleged in that warrant. Any search of digital cell-phone data that is not so directed, but instead is directed at uncovering evidence of criminal activity not identified in the warrant, is effectively a warrantless search that violates the Fourth Amendment absent some exception to the warrant requirement.” In this case, “the officer’s review of defendant’s cell-phone data for incriminating evidence relating to an armed robbery was not reasonably directed at obtaining evidence regarding drug trafficking-- the criminal activity alleged in the warrant-- and therefore the search for that evidence was outside the purview of the warrant and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment.”

Justice Viviano concurred with the majority that the second search was unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. He noted that under “the circumstances, before conducting another search of defendant’s cell phone, the officer should have obtained a second search warrant directed toward obtaining evidence of the armed-robbery offense.” However, he did not.