Constitutional challenges to amendments of the Election Law (MCL 168.1 et seq); Geographic-distribution requirement; MCL 168.471; MCL 168.477; Checkbox requirement; MCL 168.482(7); Paid-circulator-affidavit requirement; MCL 168.482a; Motion to intervene; MCR 2.209(B); Justiciability; Federated Ins Co v Oakland Cnty Rd Comm’n; Mootness; Anway v Grand Rapids Ry Co; Personhood Nevada v Bristol (NV); Poulton v Cox (UT); Standing to seek a declaratory judgment; MCR 2.605; MCR 2.605(A)(1); Lansing Sch Educ Ass’n v Lansing Bd of Educ; Deleeuw v State Bd of Canvassers; Helmkamp v Livonia City Council; Legislative standing; Coleman v Miller

Holding that the Legislature has standing to appeal when it intervenes in a case in which the Attorney General fails to defend a statute against constitutional attack, the court granted the Legislature’s motion to intervene in one of these consolidated cases. In addition, holding that this case was moot as to lead plaintiff-Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections (MFTE), and that none of the other plaintiffs had standing, it dismissed that case and vacated the constitutional holdings below. Finally, it held that because the lower courts’ decisions were vacated, the plaintiff-Legislature lacked standing to pursue its own case in the other matter. Plaintiffs-MFTE, League of Women Voters, and individuals (LWV plaintiffs) sought a declaration that recent amendments to the Election Law (procedures governing petition drives) were unconstitutional. The Legislature separately sued the Secretary of State seeking a declaration that they were constitutional. The Court of Claims held that the paid-circulator-affidavit requirement was constitutional, but that the geographic-distribution and checkbox requirements were not. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to the geographic-distribution and checkbox requirements, but reversed as to the affidavit requirement, finding it unconstitutional. The Legislature sought leave, and it also filed a motion to intervene in the LMV case. After the MFTE terminated its petition drive, the Supreme Court sought supplemental briefing on whether this mooted the LWV case as to MFTE, whether the remaining LWV plaintiffs had standing, and whether it should vacate the lower courts’ judgments. It first found that “when the Attorney General does not defend a statute against a constitutional challenge by private parties in court, the Legislature is aggrieved and, upon intervening, has standing to appeal.” As such, it had appellate standing in the LMV case. It next found that the case was moot as to MFTE, which did “not, at present, have anything at stake in this dispute.” The court then held that because the LWV plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of MCR 2.605, they did not have standing. “[N]othing in the relevant caselaw gives any voter standing to challenge any election-related laws at any time.” It further concluded that “the equitable considerations weigh in favor of vacating the lower-court decisions.” Finally, as to the Legislature’s case, it found that because any interest the Legislature may have had in the past had now dissipated, the matter was now moot “to the extent that any such interest could have justified standing” when the case was filed, and the Legislature “had no standing to pursue its case on the basis of the Attorney General opinion.”

Justice Clement concurred in part, concurred in the judgment in part, and dissented in part, noting she did not believe the court “can avoid answering the question of whether the Legislature is entitled to maintain its action . . . and get a judgment on the merits.” As such, she agreed with the majority that the Legislature cannot maintain its action, but “would answer the question squarely rather than beating around the bush.”

Justice Markman, joined by Justice Zahra, dissented, noting he “would deny the Legislature’s motion to intervene in the LWV case, hold that the Legislature has standing in its own case against the Secretary of State, and would resolve the substantive questions of law in the latter case[.]”

Justice Zahra, joined by Justice Markman, also dissented, noting that because he was “not convinced that plaintiffs, the purported moving parties now seeking to have their own case declared moot, have satisfied the heavy burden required to demonstrate mootness,” he would not grant the “rare relief” granted by the majority.