Suspension of respondent’s license to practice medicine; Violations of MCL 333.16221(a) (negligence or failure to exercise due care), MCL 333.16221(b)(i) (incompetence), MCL 333.16221(b)(vi) (lack of good moral character), & MCL 333.16221(c)(iv) (prescribing or administering drugs for other than lawful diagnostic or therapeutic purposes); Applicability of the 2016 CDC Guideline for Prescribing Opioids for Chronic Pain (CDC Guidelines) to pain management physicians as to prescribing pain medication; Negligence; Sillery v Board of Med; Whether the administrative law judge (ALJ) adopted the correct standard of care (SOC); “Good moral character”; MCL 33.8.41(1); Competent, material, & substantial evidence; Department of Cmty Health v Risch

[This opinion was previously released as an unpublished opinion on 11/19/20.] Concluding that the Board of Osteopathic and Surgical Medicine Disciplinary Subcommittee could have found, using its own expertise, that the evidence showed respondent violated the Public Health Code, the court held that the “Board’s decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record.” Thus, it affirmed the Board’s final order that fined him $25,000 and suspended his medical license for three years based on its determination that he “violated MCL 333.16221(a) (negligence or failure to exercise due care), MCL 333.16221(b)(i) (incompetence), MCL 333.16221(b)(vi) (lack of good moral character), and MCL 333.16221(c)(iv) (prescribing or administering drugs for other than lawful diagnostic or therapeutic purposes)[.]” He argued that the 2016 CDC Guidelines and other literature cited by a witness (Dr. C) as the applicable SOC applied “to primary care physicians and not chronic pain management practitioners like respondent.” But the court found that the ALJ did not err by adopting those Guidelines as the relevant SOC. “Following his review of the record and testimony, the ALJ determined that respondent did not adequately justify concurrent prescriptions, did not adequately address the risk of abuse or diversion with patients, and failed to justify the high level of medications prescribed.” C’s testimony supported those conclusions. Further, the court noted that “a disciplinary subcommittee may rely on its own expertise in determining violations of the Public Health Code.” It disagreed with respondent’s claim that the final order was not supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence showing “he violated MCL 333.16221(a) or (b)(i) through negligence and incompetency because the record” supported that he exercised due care in treating “patients and in documenting the course of their care.” Rather, it determined that C’s testimony about concerns as to “respondent’s failure to adequately justify concurrent prescriptions, to address the risk of abuse or diversion with patients, and to justify changes and high levels of medications prescribed” together with the ALJ’s own conclusions constituted sufficient competent evidence establishing “that respondent violated MCL 333.16221(a) and (b)(i), so as to support the Subcommittee’s final order.”