Jurisdiction; Whether the trial court violated respondent-mother’s right to due process by accepting her no-contest plea without ensuring that it was knowingly, understandingly, & voluntarily made; MCR 3.971(C)(1); Guardian ad litem (GAL)

The court held that the trial court violated MCR 3.971(C)(1) by failing to satisfy itself that the respondent-mother’s plea as to two of the children (A and J) was “knowingly, understandingly, and voluntarily made.” Further, it did not properly assume jurisdiction over another child, S. Thus, the manner in which it exercised jurisdiction violated respondent’s due process rights. The court vacated the trial court’s orders of adjudication—and its subsequent orders of termination—and remanded. It noted that the only questions the trial court posed to her “were if she could hear over the speaker phone, if anyone had forced her to enter her no-contest plea, and if anyone had promised her anything in exchange for the plea.” At no point did it ask her “if she understood the nature of the proceedings, the rights that had been read to her, or even the consequences of her no-contest plea. Further, the trial court’s limited consultation with respondent’s representatives was wholly inadequate.” From the initiation of the proceedings, it was aware that she “suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and this condition necessitated the appointment of her mother as her legal guardian.” To add an additional layer of protection, the trial court at an earlier hearing appointed a GAL to ensure her “welfare during the proceedings. At no time during the plea process, however, did the court make any inquiries into whether” her attorney, guardian, or GAL “had discussed with respondent her rights, the nature of the proceedings, or the consequences of a no-contest plea.” There was no indication that she was assisted by any of them. The trial court simply asked if they “were ‘comfortable’ with respondent entering a no-contest plea. On such a sparse record,” the court found that there was “simply no basis on which the trial court could have reasonably concluded that respondent understood her plea.” Thus, it plainly erred as it clearly failed to “comply with the mandates of MCR 3.971(C)(1).” This plain error affected her substantial rights. “Because (1) the plea proceedings did not comport with due process and the court rule and (2) no trial was held, respondent’s defective plea permitted the state, without due process, to interfere with her fundamental right to parent her children.” Although her defective plea did not apply to S, the trial court also failed to properly exercise jurisdiction over S, who was the subject of a separate petition. The trial court never ruled on jurisdiction as to S. Because it “never properly assumed jurisdiction over” S, all subsequent orders related to S were void.