Whether the parties had a binding arbitration agreement; Distinguishing Heurtebise v Reliable Bus Computers & Stewart v Fairlane Cmty Mental Health Ctr (On Remand); Scope of an arbitration agreement; Appellate jurisdiction; The Uniform Arbitration Act; MCL 691.1708; Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); Infliction of emotional distress (IED); Fair Treatment Process (FTP)

After rejecting plaintiffs-former employees’ assertion that it did not have jurisdiction over defendants’ appeal, the court held that the parties had a binding arbitration agreement and that it encompassed plaintiffs’ WPA claims as well as their wrongful discharge, intentional or reckless IED, and conspiracy to inflict emotional distress claims. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s orders denying defendants’ summary disposition motions and remanded for entry of an order compelling arbitration. The cases arose from the termination of plaintiffs’ employment. As to its jurisdiction, the court noted that plaintiffs’ construction “would essentially render MCL 691.1708(1) surplusage.” Any of the orders specified in the statute “would be appealable by application even without the statute. For the statute to have any meaning, it must be providing an appeal that does not otherwise exist—an appeal as of right.” As to the merits, the court agreed with defendants “that the parties entered into a valid arbitration agreement that required plaintiffs to arbitrate their statutory and nonstatutory claims.” Heurtebise and Stewart were distinguishable in that “the relevant provisions in the FTP establish that defendants intended to be bound by” it. Plaintiffs also relied on the statement in the FTP that nothing in it “shall be construed to create a contract of employment, express or implied,” which was found in the “At-Will Employment” subsection. The court noted that this was “followed by the statement the FTP does not ‘in any way alter the at-will nature of the employment relationship between the Company and its employees.’ Thus, these provisions can be read collectively to demonstrate plaintiffs agreed to be at-will employees who, along with defendants, were bound to arbitrate nearly any employment-related dispute.” Finally, the arbitration agreement “covers ‘any and all claims and disputes that are related in any way to my employment or the termination of my employment . . . .’” Given this broad coverage, and that the list of claims was “nonexclusive, the WPA claim falls under it.” Likewise, the wrongful discharge against public policy alternative claims were clearly related to plaintiffs’ termination and thus, came “within the coverage of the FTP and arbitration agreement.” The same was true for the IED and conspiracy claims.