Speedy-trial violation; Barker v Wingo

The court reversed the trial court’s order dismissing defendant’s case without prejudice on the basis of a speedy-trial violation, and remanded for application of the Barker factors to defendant’s motion. The prosecution argued that “the trial court erred by finding a speedy-trial violation based on its estimate about when defendant’s case would proceed to trial.” The court held that the “trial court did not apply the Barker factors, but instead summarily concluded that defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated because defendant’s trial would not commence for at least another 18 months. This was error. The trial court made an educated guess about how long it would be before defendant would stand trial, and then on the basis of its speculation, concluded that defendant’s right to a speedy trial would be violated by that time. That a defendant’s right to a speedy trial could be—or even would be—violated at some point in the future is clearly not a reason for concluding that the defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated.” Thus, the court concluded that “the trial court’s reasoning that defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated on the basis of the anticipated delay before defendant would stand trial was error.”