Principal residence exemption (PRE); MCL 211.7cc(1); Estate of Schubert v Department of Treasury; MCL 211.7dd(c); “Occupy”; Effect of a driver’s license & voter registration; Drew v Cass Cnty; Petitioners’ reliance on Rentschler v Melrose Twp; Tax Tribunal (TT)

Holding that the TT did not err in concluding petitioner-Karen Ellsworth had not occupied the property at issue (the South Shore Drive property) as her principal residence, the court affirmed the denial of a PRE for the property. Petitioners jointly own two Michigan homes. They asserted petitioner-Peter Ellsworth lived in their Okemos property “and spent weekends, holidays, and some vacations at the” South Shore Drive property, while Karen had lived at that “property year-round since 2005[.]” They contended the TT “adopted a wrong legal principle when it determined that Karen’s ‘legal intent’ was to establish the Okemos property as her principal residence because the statutes governing the PRE do not require ‘legal intent.’ Although MCL 211.7dd(c) does not use the exact phrase ‘legal intent,’ it provides, in relevant part, ‘“Principal residence” means the 1 place where an owner of the property has his or her true, fixed, and permanent home to which, whenever absent, he or she intends to return . . . .’” The court concluded the TT did not err in considering her “intent to return to the Okemos property because her intent to return to the South Shore Drive property was a requirement for her to establish it as her principal residence.” It also noted the TT did not rule that “Karen was not entitled to a PRE merely because she used the Okemos address for purposes of her driver’s license and voter registration. It stated that the totality of the substantial evidence demonstrated that Karen had never occupied the South Shore Drive property as her principal residence. [It] noted the legal effect of using an address on a driver’s license or voter registration, and that Karen also renewed her driver’s license with the Okemos address and voted using that address after she filed the PRE claim.” Further, it “specifically referenced the holding in Drew that such evidence was not conclusive.” The court also noted that showing "a person lived at a property for a majority of the year does not mean that they are entitled to a PRE.” After summarizing the evidence, the TT found that respondent’s evidence “was entitled to greater weight, citing the potential legal penalties for voting in the wrong district or improperly registering one’s car at the incorrect address.” The court held that the TT’s “decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence” and thus, was conclusive.