Motion to suppress evidence & statements; Probable cause; Confidential informant (CI)

Finding no errors warranting reversal, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress evidence and statements obtained by police where Detective M had probable cause to search the vehicle. Defendant argued that the CI’s tip “was insufficient to establish probable cause because it lacked detail and did not provide any predictive facts that officers could use to corroborate it.” Thus, because the CI’s “tip was about a potential future crime, and not a crime that had already been committed, defendant contends police officers did not know when this alleged crime would occur and, therefore, did not know at the time they stopped defendant’s vehicle whether he had picked up the cocaine by that time.” M testified that the CI “was someone with whom he had dealt with in the past and who had provided credible information on multiple occasions in the months leading up to this incident.” According to M, the CI’s “tip provided the following facts: a white man from the Grant area, driving a ‘new style’ maroon or red Chevrolet Silverado, would be in a certain area and would be picking up a large amount of cocaine. Police officers located a white man driving a newer model maroon or red Chevrolet Silverado” in that same area. "Police officers were also able to confirm that the vehicle was registered to defendant at an address in the Grant area.” All of the facts provided by the CI, “except the fact that defendant would be picking up a large amount of cocaine, were corroborated by police officers before the search of defendant’s vehicle was conducted. Although that fact was not corroborated by police officers before they searched defendant’s vehicle, police officers did observe defendant make two brief stops outside of residences which, on the basis of the officers’ training and experience, were consistent with drug trafficking behavior.” The court held that under “the totality of the circumstances, there was a fair probability that drugs would be found in defendant’s vehicle.” Thus, M “had probable cause to search defendant’s vehicle on the basis of the [CI’s] tip and subsequent corroboration of that tip.”