Speedy trial; The Barker factors; Barker v Wingo; People v Williams; Right of confrontation; People v Buie; Waiver; People v Kowalski; Sentencing; Cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution; Harmelin v Michigan; People v Burkett

The court held that defendant was not denied his right to a speedy trial or his right of confrontation, and he failed to establish that his mandatory minimum sentence was unconstitutional. He was convicted of AWIGBH and domestic violence, third offense, for throwing his then girlfriend on the ground, breaking her leg, then bouncing up and down on top of her while slapping her face and making her look at him. The trial court sentenced him as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 25 to 50 years for the former and 40 to 60 months for the latter. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by violating his right to a speedy trial. It found that, “of the four Barker factors, only the second factor support[ed] that defendant’s right to a speedy trial was violated, and that factor only minimally weighed against the prosecution. The other three Barker factors weighed against” his claim. The court also rejected defendant’s contention that he did not execute a valid waiver of his right to confront witnesses, noting he failed to rebut “the presumption that his counsel’s waiver of defendant’s right to confrontation was reasonable trial strategy, and so his argument does not warrant appellate relief.” Finally, the court rejected his argument that his 25-year mandatory minimum sentence was excessive in violation of the Michigan Constitution’s prohibition of cruel or unusual punishments. Defendant “has indeed demonstrated that there is at least one state in which the penalty for his crime would be less severe. However, in the other state that defendant provided current law for, the penalty for his crime could be more severe.” As such, the third factor, like factors one and two, did not support his position. Moreover, he “failed to articulate any unique circumstances which would overcome the presumption that the statutorily enhanced sentence is proportionate to the offense.” Affirmed.