Medical malpractice; Motion to strike a standard of care (SOC) expert; MCL 600.2912a(1)(b); MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(ii); Contradicting deposition testimony by affidavit; Denial of request to amend the witness list to substitute a new SOC expert; Distinguishing Tisbury v Armstrong & Duray Dev, LLC v Perrin; Admissibility of a causation expert’s testimony; MRE 702; MCL 600.2955(1)

The court held that the trial court did not err in concluding plaintiff’s SOC expert (L) was not qualified to testify as such in the family practice medicine specialty, or in denying plaintiff’s request to amend her witness list to substitute a new SOC expert. It also did not err in determining her causation expert’s (B) testimony was inadmissible and in granting defendants summary disposition as a result because she failed to show, “by scientifically acceptable evidence, that she lost an opportunity for a more favorable outcome.” The trial court dismissed all claims against defendants after granting their motion to strike L and ruling that B’s testimony was inadmissible. Defendant-Braver “is a specialist in family practice medicine and was plaintiff’s primary care physician.” Plaintiff alleged that his failure to follow up with a 12/15 “CT scan cost her the opportunity to timely treat the metastasis of her cancer.” The admissibility of L’s testimony depended on meeting the requirements of MCL 600.2169(1)(b)(ii) by showing “that during the year immediately preceding the alleged malpractice, [L] devoted a majority of her professional time to the instruction of students in family practice medicine.” The court held that plaintiff failed to do so. L testified at deposition “that she was an assistant professor in the Department of Primary Care at” a college of osteopathic medicine (referred to as Touro) from 7/14 to 12/16. Asked “if she taught a family medicine course, she replied, ‘At Touro, no.’” Plaintiff sought to establish that L’s “courses constituted instruction of family practice medicine with an affidavit in which [L] averred that ‘the physical diagnosis course and the primary care skills course are within the practice of family medicine.’” But the court determined that L’s “attempt to characterize her 2015 courses at Touro as falling ‘within the purview of the practice of family medicine’ contradicted her deposition testimony . . . . The courses [L] taught were generally applicable to all osteopathic practitioners, and” thus not in the family practice specialty. Noting that Tisbury was distinguishable and plaintiff’s reliance on Duray (involving discovery sanctions) was misplaced, the court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request to substitute a new SOC expert. Finally, B’s testimony failed to meet any of MCL 600.2955(1)’s criteria. Affirmed.