Validity of a land transfer under the statute of frauds (SOF) (MCL 566.106); MCL 566.108; Dower interest in property under MCL 558.1; MCL 558.30(2)(a); Zaher v Miotke; Slater Mgmt Corp v Nash; Berg-Powell Steel Co v Hartman Group, Inc; Tandy v Knox; Personal representative (PR)

Concluding that Zaher’s reasoning controlled, the court held that a 2006 quitclaim deed validly transferred the land at issue to the grantees (appellants and the decedent), subject to the dower interest of the decedent’s wife Constance. Further, her dower rights were extinguished before they could vest. Thus, the probate court erred in granting summary disposition to appellee-PR of the decedent’s estate, who sought to quiet title to the property. “In 2003, the decedent received certain real property, but Constance’s name was not listed on the deed. In 2006, the decedent transferred the property via quitclaim deed to himself and to appellants. Constance’s name and signature were not listed on the deed.” Appellants argued the probate court erred in ruling that the 2006 transfer was void under the SOF. The court agreed. It noted that “Constance received a mere dower interest in the property, not a co-ownership interest. Although Constance did not sign the transfer document, this did not render void the entire transfer. Under Tandy, Slater, and Zaher, the absence of Constance’s signature merely clouded the property’s title.” The court further noted that Berg-Powell was not controlling as it was decided before 11/1/90. As for Slater, the court observed in Zaher that “Slater held that a purchase agreement was ‘ineffective to convey marketable title’ absent the seller’s wife’s signature.’” However, in this case, the decedent transferred the property by quitclaim deed, not by warranty deed. “A warranty deed covenants that the grantor has marketable title. A quitclaim deed, on the other hand, does not warrant valid title and only conveys whatever interest the grantor might have.” Thus, in contrast to Slater, the decedent here “could transfer a clouded title by way of quitclaim deed because the deed only transferred whatever interest the decedent had in the property, presumably a fee simple encumbered by his wife’s inchoate dower interest.” In addition, under MCL 558.30(2)(a), “for dower rights to be exercised, the husband must die prior to” 4/6/17. However, the decedent “died in 2020. Therefore, Constance’s dower rights were extinguished after” 4/6/17. Further, she died in 2018. Thus, “any defect in the property was subsequently cured by the extinguishment of Constance’s dower interest.” The court reversed and remanded for entry of summary disposition for appellants.