Quiet title action; Whether plaintiff received unencumbered title; Jurisdiction; MCR 7.203(A)(2); “Aggrieved party”; Standing; MCL 600.2932(1); Mootness; Foreclosure by advertisement; MCL 600.3238; Termination of the redemption period; MCL 600.3238(10); Whether an affidavit had legal effect under MCL 565.451a(b); Whether an “expungement affidavit” filed under MCL 565.451a(b) can serve to expunge a foreclosure sale & revive an extinguished mortgage; Distinguishing Wilmington Sav Fund Soc’y v Clare

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting summary disposition for defendant-Dyck O’Neal on plaintiff’s quiet title and slander of title claims. Plaintiff and defendant-Wolf entered into a purchase agreement for Wolf’s property, contingent on her first and second mortgages being discharged. After the closing, Wolf paid off the first mortgage and received a discharge. But the statement of discharge made no mention of the second mortgage, so Wolf requested a payoff statement as to that mortgage. Dyck O’Neal then notified Wolf that she still owed a debt on the second mortgage, but payments were not made. After the second mortgage was assigned to Dyck O’Neal, it initiated foreclosure proceedings. Plaintiff then filed suit. Meanwhile defendant-Malavia purchased the property at a sheriff’s sale. On appeal, the court first found meritless Malavia’s argument that it lacked jurisdiction to decide this case because plaintiff was not an aggrieved party. “Because the trial court’s order ‘operates on [plaintiff’s alleged] rights and property’ and because plaintiff has a pecuniary interest in the outcome of this case,” plaintiff was an aggrieved party. It also rejected Malavia’s claim that the appeal was moot because the redemption period terminated. “[B]ecause the district court’s decision to enter the judgment of possession could be overturned and because Malavia’s interest in the property hinges on the legal effect of” an affidavit, it considered plaintiff’s appellate argument. The court further rejected plaintiff’s contention that the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for Dyck O’Neal because the “affidavit did not have legal effect and the second mortgage was extinguished,” leaving Dyck O’Neal without an interest in the property. “[U]nlike the affidavit in Clare, the affidavit in this case did not create the condition that affected an interest in the property.” Rather, Wolf and defendant-Litton’s independent agreement to set aside the sheriff’s sale on the property “created the condition, and the affidavit merely stated facts concerning the representative’s knowledge of that agreement.” In addition, when the affidavit was executed and recorded, “Wolf still had a present interest in the property as the holder of the redemption rights.” In sum, the affidavit “contained information within the scope of MCL 565.451a(b) and therefore had legal effect. Because the undisputed evidence establishes that the second mortgage was not extinguished in 2009, Dyck O’Neal had an interest in the property by virtue of the lien.” Affirmed.