Attorney fees under 42 USC § 1988; “Prevailing parties”; Whether the relief plaintiffs obtained was “enduring” enough to support prevailing-party status

The court held that plaintiffs’ success in obtaining a preliminary injunction against certain voting provisions seven months before the provisions were repealed constituted “enduring” relief entitling them to an attorney-fee award under § 1988 as “prevailing parties.” Plaintiffs challenged a Tennessee law that imposed “a raft of new requirements upon persons or organizations conducting voter-registration activities in the State[,]” which they alleged significantly burdened their rights of speech and association. They also alleged that the law was unconstitutionally vague. The district court preliminarily enjoined the statute, and seven months later, the provisions were repealed. The parties stipulated to dismissal without prejudice. Plaintiffs then moved for attorney fees under § 1988 as prevailing parties. The district court granted their motion, but reduced the amount requested. On appeal, the court noted that plaintiffs were undisputedly granted a preliminary injunction, which “was never reversed, dissolved, or even vacated after the plaintiffs’ voluntary dismissal of the case.” Defendants argued that the court relief plaintiffs obtained was not “‘enduring’ enough” to confer prevailing-party status where the laws were repealed seven months later. The court explained that the relief in this case was not “fleeting” where the injunction was granted four months after the case was filed, “after full briefing and an opportunity for each side to present evidence supporting its position;” and the injunction was never dissolved or vacated. The voter-registration drives plaintiffs were able to conduct during the seven months before the state government repealed the offending provisions, and the registrations that resulted, constituted “enduring” relief. The court found that a “preliminary injunction that, as a practical matter, concludes the litigation in the plaintiffs’ favor in the district court, and that is not challenged on appeal, is—on this record at least—enduring enough to support prevailing-party status under § 1988.” Affirmed.