Limitations on cross-examination; The rape-shield statute (MCL 750.520j); People v Hackett; People v Williams; Evidence of a witness’ bias or interest in a case; People v Mumford; The hearsay exception for statements made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis (MRE 803(4)); People v Mahone; Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27a & 768.27b; MRE 403; People v Watkins; The tender-years hearsay exception (MRE 803A); People v Gursky; Sexual-assault nurse examiner (SANE); Children’s Protective Services (CPS)

The court held that there was no error in the trial court’s prohibiting defendant from questioning the victim (A, his daughter) in this CSC case “about prior allegations of sexual abuse she made against a family friend.” There also was no abuse of discretion in not allowing him to inquire “into speculative and potential punishments for crimes with which” his son (J) was never charged. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting statements A made to a SANE under MRE 803(4) and to her grandmother under MRE 803A, or other acts evidence under MCL 768.27a and 27b. Thus, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC I convictions. The admissibility of the evidence about A’s references to sexual abuse by a family friend hinged on “whether defendant could make a sufficient showing” the allegations were false. The trial “court was only informed that, when asked about the allegations, [A] responded, ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t remember.’” These responses did not establish that A’s “prior allegations were shown to be false. Similarly, the failure of a CPS investigation to substantiate the allegations” did not establish that they were proven false. Defendant next contended that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred him from cross-examining J about the potential penalties for crimes J “avoided as part of his immunity agreements with the” prosecutors in two counties. However, J was not charged in either county “and, without knowing what charges [he] faced, it was impossible to reliably determine what potential punishment [he] avoided. The trial court appropriately permitted the jury to be made aware of the immunity agreements under which [J] testified, thereby allowing defendant to confront the witness regarding a key influence that could have affected his credibility.” As to the other acts evidence, the court was “satisfied that the trial court appropriately considered the Watkins factors” and concluded that the decision to admit this evidence “did not fall outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” As to A's statements to her grandmother, A “spontaneously started the conversation without any indication that [her] grandmother prompted [A’s] statements or influenced them with leading questions.” And the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the “four-month delay in disclosure was reasonable” given the evidence of A’s “well-grounded fear of defendant.”