Reasonable reunification efforts; Aggravated circumstances; In re Simonetta; MCL 722.638(1) & (2); Termination at the initial disposition; MCR 3.977(E); § 19b(3)(k)(iii); Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts Minors; Doctrine of anticipatory neglect; In re LaFrance Minors

The court held that respondent-mother did not establish the trial court plainly erred in “terminating her parental rights without ordering the DHHS to provide reunification services.” Also, the trial court did not err by finding termination was in the children’s best interests. The court noted that while “the DHHS did not use the phrase ‘aggravated circumstances’ in the petition, it sought termination of respondent’s parental rights under” multiple statutory grounds, including § (k)(iii). Also, the petition “included factual allegations that identified the acts constituting ‘battering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.’” Respondent pled “no contest to these allegations and stipulated to their use to establish the factual basis for her plea. The trial court accepted respondent’s no-contest plea to statutory grounds for termination, finding that the petition allegations provided an adequate factual basis. The trial court also found that several statutory grounds for termination had been proven, including” § (k)(iii). While “the trial court did not expressly state that it found aggravated circumstances excusing the need for reasonable efforts, the court’s finding of statutory grounds under subparagraph (k)(iii) ‘amount to a judicial determination’ that respondent subjected” one of the children, NR, “to aggravated circumstances under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii).” Thus, the DHHS was “not statutorily required to make reasonable efforts at reunification, and respondent cannot establish plain error.” Respondent cited Simonetta “to argue that failing to make an appropriate finding of aggravated circumstances is a reversible error.” Broadly speaking, the court agreed. But on closer inspection, it was “not persuaded that the Supreme Court’s order mandated such a bright-line rule.” The court compared § (k)(iii) with MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii), which “specifically provides that one aggravating circumstance is abuse by a parent that includes ‘[b]attering, torture, or other severe physical abuse’—identical language to MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(iii).” In this case, unlike in Simonetta, the trial court “necessarily made a ‘judicial determination’ of aggravating circumstances under MCL 722.638(1)(a)(iii) by finding clear and convincing evidence that respondent committed abuse involving ‘[b]attering, torture, or other severe physical abuse.’” Affirmed.