The Michigan Zoning Enabling Act; “Aggrieved party” under MCL 125.3605 & 125.3606(1); Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance v Saugatuck Twp; Jurisdictional time limit for filing an appeal in the circuit court; MCR 7.104(A)(1); MCL 125.3606(3); Exhaustion of administrative remedies; Standing to challenge zoning ordinance changes; Demand for a writ of mandamus or superintending control; As-applied constitutional challenges; Vagueness challenge; Failure to support a claim; Whether the planning commission’s decision was legislative or administrative; Zoning board of appeals (ZBA); Neighborhood Node (NN)

The court held that the circuit court did not err in granting defendant-city summary disposition and in dismissing plaintiff-Stafa’s amended complaint. He did not have standing to challenge the changes to § 5.06 of the city’s zoning ordinances. His claims as to the denial of a “site plan application should have been timely appealed to the circuit court. An order of superintending control was not appropriate because an appeal was available.” He argued that his amended complaint “was a permissible original action challenging various” city actions and not an untimely appeal of the ZBA’s decision, which denied his appeal from the planning commission’s denial of his site plan application. The complaint made demands for declaratory relief that fit into two categories – (1) declaratory relief as to § “5.06, the new zoning ordinance describing NN Districts; and (2) declaratory relief from the planning commission’s denial of Stafa’s site plan, and the ZBA’s denial of his appeal.” The court first determined that he lacked standing to challenge the changes to § 5.06, which “was amended after the ZBA denied Stafa’s appeal and there is no evidence the newly-enacted language of the ordinance was ever adversely applied to” him. As to his other request for declaratory relief, he “generally contested the planning commission’s and the ZBA’s assessments and decisions related to his site plan application.” As his claims were directly related to the ZBA’s denial of his appeal, he could have pursued them “in an appeal to the circuit court. Because Stafa did not timely appeal these claims to the circuit court, the circuit court correctly concluded these claims were time-barred under MCL 125.3606(3) and [it] lacked jurisdiction to consider them.” As to his request for a writ of mandamus, an order of superintending control replaces such a writ “‘when directed to a lower court or tribunal.’” And given that he “was a party aggrieved by the ZBA’s decision, and an appeal of the ZBA’s decision was available in the circuit court, the circuit court did not err by dismissing his request for an order of superintending control.” Further, his as-applied constitutional challenges could have been addressed in such an appeal. “As such, the circuit court did not err by applying the standards under MCL 125.3604(1) and MCL 125.360, or by relying on the” exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine in granting the city’s motion to dismiss. Affirmed.