Third-party (grandparents) child custody action; Established custodial environment (ECE); Vodvarka v Grasmeyer; Proper cause or a change of circumstances; The statutory best-interest factors; MCL 722.23; Best-interest factors (a), (b), (c), (e), (j), & (k); Presumption of parental fitness; MCL 722.25(1); Harmless error; MCR 2.613(A); Parenting time; Transcripts

The court held that the trial court did not err by granting plaintiffs-maternal grandparents sole legal and physical custody of defendant-father’s child, DM. The probate court found that 11 of the best-interest factors weighed in plaintiffs’ favor. It held that DM had an ECE with plaintiffs, that the presumption of parental fitness was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, that custody with defendant was not in DM’s best interests, and that he was entitled to “reasonable parenting time.” The trial court entered a judgment consistent with the probate court’s opinion, granting plaintiffs sole physical and legal custody of DM. It also adopted the parenting time order by reference, and stated that defendant “shall be entitled to reasonable parenting time upon the hearing on a motion regarding the same.” He argued that the probate court erred by failing to consider whether proper cause or a change of circumstances existed before changing DM’s custody, and that it abused its discretion by awarding plaintiffs sole physical and legal custody. The court concluded “ample evidence demonstrated that [the mother’s] death and related circumstances constituted a change of circumstances that warranted revisiting the existing custody order, and any error by the probate court in this respect was harmless.” Further, the probate court “correctly applied the law and did not abuse its discretion in holding that sole custody of DM by plaintiffs was in DM’s best interests.” The court found the probate court’s findings that each of the challenged best-interest factors “weighed heavily in favor of plaintiffs” were not against the great weight of the evidence. Finally, it rejected defendant’s contention that the probate court violated his right to due process by refusing to consider parenting time before terminating its jurisdiction, and that his due process rights were violated because portions of the custody hearings could not be transcribed and there was a delay in the production and filing of the transcripts. “The probate court’s opinion was not silent as to parenting-time; rather, [it] held that the existing parenting-time order would continue unless a party sought to change it.” Further, it did “not appear the probate court heavily relied on the missing testimony.” Moreover, while defendant was “correct there was a delay in locating the transcripts and in the transcripts being filed, we fail to see how this can be attributed to the probate court.” Affirmed.