Child placement; MCL 712A.2(b)(1)(C); Modification of placement; MCR 3.966(A)(1); Removal; MCL 712A.2(b); Principle that a parent may entrust the care of his or her children for extended periods of time to others “without court interference by the state as long as the child is adequately cared for”; In re Weldon; Parental fitness; Neglect; MCL 722.602; Authorization of a petition for jurisdiction; MCL 712A.13a(2); Due process; In re Sanders; In re Eldridge; Guardian ad litem (GAL)

The court held that although the DHHS’s delays in this case were “deeply troubling,” the trial court reasonably determined that the fictive kin suggested by respondent-father was an inappropriate placement. Within days after the child’s birth, the DHHS petitioned for his removal from his mother and for the termination of her parental rights. It knew that respondent was the child’s likely father. Respondent, who was incarcerated, expeditiously established his paternity. But the DHHS neglected to file a petition naming him as a respondent for 15 months after his child was placed in foster care. During this time, respondent urged the trial court to place his son with PM, fictive kin. The trial court rejected this option, and ordered the child’s removal. On appeal, the court noted that he “was not immediately available to ensure that his selected custodian could adequately care for” the child, who “was already in foster care by that time, as ordered by the [trial] court when the child was removed from his mother’s care. And although [respondent] quickly designated PM as his son’s custodian, evidence submitted . . . by both the DHHS and the GAL supported that PM would not adequately care for the child.” The majority disagreed with the dissent’s contention that once respondent directed that the child be placed with PM, the trial court had no legal authority to leave the child in foster care. Respondent’s “incarceration and his absence at the child’s birth put him in the unenviable position of being unable to directly place his child without DHHS input. When he was able to direct [the child’s] placement, the child was 5½ months old and living in a stable foster family placement.” Balancing the interests pursuant to Eldridge, the court concluded the trial court did not err by initially refusing to transfer the child’s custody. But it noted “the evidentiary basis for this refusal was not well fleshed out, and on remand [directed] that the DHHS conduct a home study of PM forthwith.” Despite the “ongoing violation of father’s constitutional rights, the [trial] court ultimately properly took jurisdiction over the child in relation to father.” When the trial court allowed him more “time, he could name no other possible placement for the child.” This left the child “‘without proper custody or guardianship’ supporting jurisdiction.” Further, the petition outlined his “history of violent and drug-related crimes . . . ,” the most recent of which resulted in his present imprisonment until at least 10/23 “and possibly as late as 2028. [He] cannot personally provide a home for his child ‘by reason of . . . criminality.’ Absent a suitable alternate placement, the [trial] court was bound to take jurisdiction over” the child in relation to respondent. “Going forward, the [trial] court and the DHHS must tread carefully to avoid repeating their mistakes.” Affirmed.