Motion to vacate a conviction based on United States v Davis; 28 USC § 2255; Whether petitioner was entitled to move to vacate one conviction where he would not be released from custody due to his remaining life sentences; “In custody”; Effect of his “special assessment”; The “concurrent sentence doctrine”; Ray v United States

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss petitioner-Amaya’s § 2255 petition to vacate one of his convictions without reaching the merits where (1) his remaining life sentences meant he would not be released from custody and (2) Ray did not apply because the case did not come before the court on direct review. Amaya was convicted of conspiracy to travel in interstate commerce with intent to commit murder, which carried a mandatory life sentence, using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine. He was sentenced to life on each count, and received a special assessment totaling $300 for his convictions. He filed a pro se motion to vacate his firearm conviction under § 2255, arguing that under Davis, his murder-conspiracy conviction could no longer be considered a predicate violent crime for his firearm conviction. Without reaching the merits, the district court denied his motion under the concurrent sentence doctrine. On appeal, the court explained that § 2255 provides relief only to prisoners who claim a right to be released from custody. Amaya is serving three concurrent life sentences. The court reasoned that even if one of his convictions were vacated, “he would still be in prison for the rest of his life.” It rejected his argument that the $100 special assessment for each of his convictions constituted “a harm that makes his claim cognizable[,]” noting that fines do not create a sufficient “‘restraint on liberty’” and concluding that if “a fine is not ‘custody,’ then a petitioner seeking nothing more than relief from an obligation to pay a monetary assessment is not ‘claiming the right to be released’ from custody and is not entitled to relief under § 2255.” Amaya cited Ray, where the Supreme Court held that because a ruling in the petitioner’s favor would relieve a special assessment, his sentences were not actually “concurrent.” But the court held that Ray did not apply where this case did not come before the court on direct review. It explained that “Amaya has made no argument that vacating his conviction would affect his custody because his sole request for monetary relief does not suffice. So he has not shown the kind of prejudice that could state a claim under the plain terms of § 2255 (whether or not the concurrent sentence doctrine would otherwise apply).”