Sufficiency of the evidence for a conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder; Whether the identity of the intended victim is an element of the crime; Due process; Notice of the alleged intended victim; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request a bill of particulars; Failure to object; Jury instructions; Waiver; Failure to request a specific unanimity instruction; The transferred-intent doctrine; People v Welsh (Welsh III); Sentencing; Authority to sentence defendant to life without parole; MCL 750.316; MCL 750.157a(a); Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Burkett; People v Fernandez

On remand from the Michigan Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Welsh III, the court concluded Welsh III did not apply here and again held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant’s conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder. It also again held that the identity of the intended target of the conspiracy is not an element of the crime and rejected his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. In addition, it again rejected his sentencing challenges. Thus, the court again affirmed his conviction and his sentence to life without the possibility of parole. It determined that this case differed from Welsh III. The jury here “was never instructed that the transferred-intent doctrine applied to the conspiracy charge, and the jury never expressed confusion regarding the relevant instructions or provided a note suggesting that it was finding defendant guilty of the charged conspiracy on the basis of a different, uncharged conspiracy.” Further, nothing in Welsh III changed the court’s holding that sufficient evidence supported defendant’s conviction. He again claimed “he was denied fair notice of the target(s) of the conspiracy because the felony information did not identify the intended target(s).” However, as the court explained in its prior opinion (Bouie I), “‘the identity of the person who was the target of the conspiracy is not an element of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder.’” Thus, the court found that nothing in Welsh III altered its prior conclusion, which it adopted here, “that ‘defendant’s due-process claim fails because he has not established that he was denied adequate notice and thus deprived of an adequate opportunity to prepare his defense.’” In addition, it again rejected his contention that the trial court lacked authority to sentence him to life without parole, concluding that under MCL 750.157a(a) and 750.316, the trial court was “bound to sentence defendant to life imprisonment without parole for his conviction of conspiracy to commit first-degree premeditated murder.” Finally, his cruel or unusual punishment argument failed in light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Fernandez. And he did not present “‘any unusual circumstances that would render the presumptively proportionate legislatively mandated sentence disproportionate.’”