Polygraph testimony; People v Nash; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Other acts evidence under MCL 768.27a(1); Due process; People v Muniz; MRE 403; People v Watkins; DNA evidence; People v Coy (Coy I & II); MRE 702

The court held that defendant-Jackson did not show “a plain, outcome-determinative error” as to his claim a witness was allowed to testify about a polygraph, and failed to establish that defense counsel was ineffective for not objecting. It further concluded the trial court did not err when it failed to exclude other acts testimony under MRE 403, and the court rejected his due process challenge to MCL 768.27a(1). It also held that the trial court did not plainly err in failing to exclude DNA “testimony under MRE 702, the decisions in Coy I and Coy II, or under MRE 403.” And defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to make a futile objection to this testimony. Thus, the court affirmed defendant’s CSC I and II convictions. It first determined that while a witness “improperly referred to a lie detector test, her reference does not automatically warrant a new trial.” It appeared her remark was inadvertent and it was arguably unresponsive. She tried “to explain that she reported the past misconduct—not Jackson—and she blurted out that ‘she called the lie detector test’ as part of that effort.” But the reference was “enigmatic. It was not clear whether she was saying that she called for one to be administered or was calling the persons responsible for administering one. In any event, the context did not allow an inference that anyone actually took a polygraph test. The statement did not implicate any particular person or any particular result, and it did not bolster or undermine any witness’s testimony. Accordingly, any prejudice occasioned by the remark was de minimis and could readily have been cured with an instruction.” Defense counsel did not object “presumably because there was no need given that the trial court itself immediately intervened.” Further, under the “circumstances, a reasonable defense lawyer might choose to let the matter pass without further comment.” As to the other acts testimony, the court found that the factors identified in Watkins all weighed in favor of admitting witness-JB’s testimony. In addition, the “trial court had no obligation to provide an analysis on matters beyond that which defense counsel contested.” The court concluded the trial court did not err in ruling “that the evidence tending to show that Jackson also abused JB was admissible under MCL 768.27a and” in refusing to exclude it under MRE 403.