Flight jury instruction; Waived issue; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the instruction; Constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii); Separation of powers; Whether the statute is facially unconstitutional

The court held that defense counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to the flight instruction. Also, as to the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), the court held that because defendant's arguments have been considered and rejected by the court, he could not establish a plain error. He was convicted of first-degree premediated murder and mutilation of a dead body. He argued that counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the flight instruction. The evidence showed that he “suddenly ‘disappeared’ from his job on board” a United States Naval Sea Cadet Ship, leaving behind some of his possessions. “According to the prosecution’s theory, which was consistent with the evidence, this fleeing from the ship happened right after” the victim was killed. “This would constitute ‘fleeing from the scene of the crime’ and” supported the flight instruction. As to his argument regarding the constitutionality of MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii), the court noted that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(iii) “allows a court to impose ‘any cost reasonably related to the actual costs incurred by the trial court without separately calculating those costs involved in the particular case.’” Defendant argued “that this statute violates our Constitution’s separation of powers because the statute constitutes an improper delegation by the Legislature to the judicial branch. This Court has already addressed this issue and held that the delegation of power is not unconstitutional.” Defendant also asserted “that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it violates a defendant’s right to due process by creating the potential for bias in trial judges who are pressured to raise money in the form of criminal sanctions to fund the court. This Court has also addressed and rejected this same argument.”