Whether a state law prescriptive easement claim was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA); The Surface Transportation Board’s (STB) exclusive jurisdiction; Whether the “categorical” or “as-applied” framework applied; Whether defendant was seeking an “exclusive” easement

Noting that it had “not previously examined ICCTA preemption in the context of easements,” the court held that defendant-Dille Road Recycling Center’s prescriptive easement claim was preempted by the ICCTA where the easement sought was “exclusive and incompatible with rail use.” Plaintiff-Norfolk owns a parcel of land adjacent to its railway line. Dille, who owns adjacent property, has used the parcel at issue for years, primarily as a weighing station and scrap dump. After a dispute arose, Dille sought adverse possession or, in the alternative, a prescriptive easement. Norfolk argued that Dille’s claim was preempted by the ICCTA. Relying primarily on STB decisions, the district court disagreed and granted Dille an easement. It ruled that although adverse possession claims are categorically preempted, this did not hold true for prescriptive easement claims because in contrast to adverse possession, “‘a prescriptive easement does not take railroad property [but] allows co-existing rail and non-rail uses.’” On appeal, the court concluded that “whether an easement is preempted is a factual determination based on the specific nature of the easement sought and how it would affect railroad operations broadly. On one end of the spectrum are routine, nonexclusive easements such as at-grade crossings and aerial easements. These are generally not preempted. . . . On the other end, easements that are exclusive or deemed adverse possession by another name are often preempted.” After considering the STB’s approach, as well as the rulings in other circuits, the court held that “proper evaluation of ICCTA preemption for prescriptive-easement claims is the as-applied framework.” It noted that the touchstone of this analysis “is ‘whether the state regulation imposes an unreasonable burden on railroading.’” In turn, reasonableness “is a question of the scope of the ‘taking.’” The court rejected Dille’s argument that it was not seeking an “exclusive” easement. It concluded that “the record and the relevant case law confirms that Dille’s prospective easement would be so exclusive and conflicting that it would be essentially adverse possession by another name. The Parcel is, and must remain, fenced off to the exclusion of Norfolk.” The court found that “Dille’s easement no doubt excludes Norfolk and Norfolk has no conceivable way to reclaim any real use of its own property.” Reversed.