Healthcare provider’s claims under the No-Fault Act (NFA); MCL 500.3112; The real-party-in-interest rule; C-Spine Orthopedics, PLLC v Progressive MI Ins Co; Standing

Holding that intervening plaintiff-C-Spine “had standing and remained a real party in interest despite assignments to third parties[,]” the court concluded the trial court erred in granting defendant-insurer’s summary disposition motion. Plaintiff-Hammock sued defendant for no-fault benefits after an auto accident. C-Spine, which had treated Hammock for his injuries, intervened as a purported assignee of his rights under the NFA. While it “had entered into numerous bulk purchase and sale agreements for accounts receivable with multiple different factoring companies—of which Hammock’s were included—at a later date, C-Spine agreed to counter-assignments of Hammock’s claims with the same factoring companies.” In its summary disposition motion as to C-Spine’s claims, defendant asserted the “case should be dismissed under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10) because C-Spine was not a real party in interest, and therefore, had no standing to bring the suit.” The trial court agreed. On appeal, the court held that “the real-party-in-interest rule does not preclude C-Spine’s suit.” It noted the facts here were nearly identical to another, published case involving C-Spine, and it concluded the same analysis applied here. “C-Spine is a real party in interest in the suit against defendant because it filed a claim under” the NFA. It “became vested with the right of action against defendant based on the assignment from Hammock and is authorized by MCL 500.3112 to sue in its own name. Even if the factoring companies had a beneficial interest in Hammock’s claims, it would not eliminate C-Spine as a real party in interest. However, the beneficial interest was transferred back to C-Spine through the counter-assignments. If the counter-assignments from the factoring companies back to C-Spine did not exist, the proper remedy, as” the court held in the other case, would be joinder rather than dismissal. As to the related issue of standing, the court held in the prior case “that C-Spine had statutory standing to file suit under MCL 500.3112[.]” It found that because the statute provided C-Spine with “standing, its suit was not precluded.” This finding could likewise be applied here. Reversed and remanded.