Piercing the veil of judicial impartiality; People v Stevens; Wheeler v Wallace; Offer of mental health services to the jury after the victim’s testimony; Denial of defendant’s motion for a mistrial; People v Haywood

The court agreed with defendant “that the trial court abused its discretion and pierced the veil of judicial impartiality by offering mental health services to the jury after the victim’s testimony and by subsequently declining to grant a mistrial.” Defendant was convicted of CSC I and II. Of primary concern to the court was the “nature of the [trial] court’s comments and the judge’s demeanor.” The record indicated it “advised the jury that ‘these cases are—are challenging for me and everyone else in the courtroom, and I know they are for you as well.’ This came directly on the heels of the victim’s testimony. There is no evidence in the record that anyone in the jury appeared distressed by the victim’s testimony at the time, although the trial judge was clearly distressed by the contents of said testimony. Thus, it would appear that the comments largely reflected the trial court’s opinion of, and feelings about, the victim’s testimony—namely that it was ‘challenging’ for the court to hear it.” Defendant contended the nature of the “comments evidenced its belief in the credibility of the witness’s testimony.” The court was “inclined to agree.” It concluded the trial court’s “decision to reference the need for mental health services could have tainted the jury’s view of the evidence, no matter how well-intentioned the act might have been.” The court also found that the timing of the trial “court’s curative instruction matters. Had [it] immediately walked its statement back and gave a curative instruction explaining the purpose of its comments, the impact on the jury could certainly have been lessened. Instead, court was adjourned for the day and a curative instruction was not given until court reconvened the following day, thus giving the jury a full 24-hour period to contemplate the nature of the [trial] court’s statements in relation to the victim’s testimony. For a limiting instruction to truly cure an error such as this, it must be clearly and immediately delivered to the jury.” The court held that given “the totality of the circumstances, the trial court pierced the veil of judicial impartiality by indicating that it was disturbed by the victim’s testimony, thus creating the appearance of sympathy for, or partiality toward, the victim. Combined with the length of time between the comments and [its] eventual delivery of a curative” jury instruction, its actions prejudiced defendant. Thus, the court concluded he was entitled to a new trial. Reversed and remanded.