Auto negligence; The sudden emergency doctrine; White v Taylor Distrib Co, Inc; Principle that the sudden emergency doctrine is an extension of the reasonably prudent person rule & is not an affirmative defense; Szymborski v Slatina; Principle that a driver has no duty to guard against or anticipate an unknown hazard; Briggs v Knapp

Holding that the issue concerning the sudden emergency doctrine raised by defendant in this case should be resolved by a jury, the court reversed the summary disposition award for defendant and remanded. Plaintiff, on behalf of her minor daughter (DM), sued defendant for injuries DM sustained when she was trying to cross a road on her scooter and was struck by defendant’s vehicle. The trial court granted summary disposition for defendant based on the sudden emergency doctrine. On appeal, the court found summary disposition was inappropriate at this juncture. “[D]efendant admitted at her deposition that the weather was clear and sunny on the day of the collision. She conceded that she saw pedestrians in the center turn lane and the two girls on their scooters approaching the center turn lane as she drove in their direction. She commented that she had her ‘eye on the road’ and saw DM’s ‘scooter not stopping out of the corner of [her] eye.’” She explained “she was driving at the speed limit of 35 miles per hour, and she ‘swerved to the right to avoid hitting [DM] head-on.’” Her deposition testimony offered “ample support for plaintiff’s contention that an issue of material fact precludes an award of summary disposition” under the sudden emergency doctrine. In addition, “defendant’s admission that she saw the pedestrians and the two girls on scooters enter the center turn lane . . . as she was driving in their direction dictates that she had a duty to guard against and anticipate the hazard presented by those people in the center turn lane. Whether she breached that duty in a manner that establishes liability for negligence presents a question of fact for a jury, which can assess the applicability of the sudden emergency doctrine in the course of deliberations.”