Jury instructions; Lesser offense instruction; Voluntary manslaughter; People v Mendoza; Malice; Adequate provocation; People v Pouncey; Harmless error; Evidence of a victim’s intoxication; People v Feezel; Relevance; MRE 401 & 402; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Sentencing; Scoring of OV 19 (interference with the administration of justice); MCL 777.49(c); People v Hershey; Proportionality; Restitution; MCL 769.1a; People v Bentley; Future income; MCL 780.766(4)(c); Psychological treatment; MCL 780.766(4)(d)

The court held that defendant failed to identify any errors warranting reversal of his conviction, or in the scoring of OV 19. But while the trial court did not err in ordering restitution, the court vacated the order to the extent it included an amount for future counseling services. And it found the trial court failed to provide sufficient justification for his minimum sentence. Thus, it affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. He was convicted of second-degree murder in the stabbing death of the victim, S. The trial court sentenced him to 33 to 90 years, and ordered him to pay restitution. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury on manslaughter and by denying his request to present evidence that S had alcohol and cocaine in her system. “[B]ecause there was insufficient evidence to allow a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that [defendant] acted under the influence of passion, the trial court did not err when it refused to instruct the jury that it could convict [him] of the lesser included offense of manslaughter without regard to whether [S’s] shove would have constituted adequate provocation.” In addition, there was no evidence defendant knew S personally before the incident, or “had personal knowledge of her conduct while intoxicated or under the influence of cocaine.” He could not “argue that he feared her because he was aware that she was violent and dangerous while drunk or high.” The court also rejected his claim that the trial court erred in scoring OV 19. The evidence that he “tried to close the door on the officers and that [the detective] had to force the door open to take [him] into custody under the authority of an arrest warrant permitted an inference that [he] was disregarding a lawful command, which can constitute interference with the administration of justice.” However, as to his proportionality argument, although an above-guidelines minimum sentence was likely justified, “the trial court did not provide sufficient justification for the sentence imposed.” He also contended that the trial court had no authority to order him to reimburse S for lost income and, alternatively, that it improperly included S’s income losses on the basis of speculative evidence. And he claimed the order should not have included costs for S’s family’s future counseling expenses. “[T]here was sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s finding that [S] would have earned $1,539,574.40 over her expected remaining years.” But there was no evidence that S’s family “reasonably expected to incur additional psychological expenses and no evidence concerning the expected length of treatment, the causal link between the treatment and the crime, or the reasonable costs of the treatment.”