Termination under § 19b(3)(b)(i); Doctrine of anticipatory neglect

Concluding that § (b)(i) existed and that termination of respondent-father’s parental rights was in the child's (DB) best interests, the court affirmed. He contended “that the trial court clearly erred by terminating his parental rights to DB because there was no evidence that he abused or neglected DB.” The court noted that the trial court found that one of respondent's other children, CB, “suffered new and old nonaccidental injuries and a life-threatening injury for which respondent admitted responsibility. The court also found that [he] had not demonstrated benefit from services before voluntarily releasing his parental rights to his other children.” The record supported these findings. “The trial court further found that there was a reasonable likelihood, based on the nonaccidental life-threatening injury respondent inflicted on CB, that the children would be harmed if returned to respondent because ‘how you treat one child is evidence of how you would or could treat the other.’” Respondent argued “that no evidence was presented demonstrating that he abused or neglected DB, and that the trial court erred by applying the doctrine of anticipatory neglect.” This argument was unpersuasive. “In determining whether there was clear and convincing evidence to support termination of respondent’s parental rights to DB under [§ (b)(i)], the trial court was required to determine that ‘a sibling of the child has suffered physical injury[,]’ the respondent’s ‘act caused the physical injury[,]’ and ‘there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in [the parents]’s home.’” The court held that the “trial court’s finding that DB’s sibling, CB, suffered new and old nonaccidental injuries and a life-threatening injury for which respondent admitted responsibility was supported by the record evidence, and the trial court appropriately considered [his] responsibility for CB’s life-threatening injuries when determining that there was a reasonable likelihood that DB would be harmed in the foreseeable future if placed in respondent’s home.” The court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake by finding clear and convincing evidence supported termination” of his parental rights to DB under § (b)(i).