Surcharge for attendant-care services; Collateral estoppel; Bryan v JP Morgan Chase Bank

The court held that the probate court properly concluded that plaintiff was barred from relitigating an issue that had been previously litigated. In 1986, RB sustained serious injuries in an automobile accident, necessitating around-the-clock care. When RB’s mother died, plaintiff served as conservator, provider, and coordinator of RB’s care, and became the designated recipient of monthly lump-sum attendant-care payments. But she admitted that RB’s brother, who had moved in with RB, was caring for him full-time. The probate court found plaintiff breached her fiduciary duties and imposed a surcharge requiring her to pay $125,412.30 to RB’s estate. Plaintiff later filed a complaint in the circuit court, asserting the probate court failed to determine the amount due for her attendant-care services when it surcharged her. The circuit court found that judicial economy weighed in favor of deferring to the probate court. The probate court found it had already litigated the issues and determined plaintiff’s complaint was “a collateral attack” on the surcharge order, warranting dismissal with prejudice. On appeal, the court found that the parties in this case “and the surcharge proceedings were either the same parties or their privies: plaintiff was party to both actions, and although the conservator for RB in the previous proceeding (appointed after plaintiff’s removal) appears to be different from the current conservator, in their official capacities, they are privies because both discharged the fiduciary duties attendant to protecting RB’s interests.” And the “issues sought to be litigated were also the same: the extent to which plaintiff was liable to RB’s estate by way of the surcharge order.” In both cases, plaintiff claimed “entitlement to more than $120,000 surcharged by the probate court. But she also admitted that RB’s brother provided ‘full-time’ care to RB, and it appears that other family members also provided care.” Plaintiff repeatedly told the probate court previously “that she had no evidence and was entirely unable, and unwilling, to provide any accounting. And nothing in the record in this case indicates that [she] is any better prepared to present such evidence now.” The surcharge order resolved the issue, directing her “to repay RB’s estate more than $120,000, the amount of unaccounted-for benefits paid over several years.” That order “was a final order appealable by right” and plaintiff “had the opportunity to appeal and was unsuccessful because she failed to timely pursue her right to” do so. The order “is now final with any appellate opportunities exhausted.” Affirmed.