42 USC § 1983 action arising from a slip & fall in a jail shower; Whether plaintiff adequately alleged that the slippery shower violated the Due Process Clause; Whether plaintiff adequately alleged defendant-county’s “policy or custom” caused her injuries; Monell v Department of Soc Servs; Whether the second amended complaint’s claims against defendant-healthcare provider were barred by the statute of limitations; Accrual; Whether the second complaint “related back” to the first complaint; FedRCivP 15(c)(1); “Equitable tolling”

In this § 1983 action, the court held that plaintiff-pretrial detainee Coleman’s due process claim against defendant-Hamilton County failed where the ordinary risk of a slippery shower “falls well below what is required to show an unconstitutional risk for inmates.” It also concluded as to her inadequate medical care claim against the County that she failed to allege it “had an official policy of mistreating injured inmates.” It further upheld the statute-of-limitations dismissal of her constitutional claims against defendants-healthcare provider, its employees, and county corrections officers added in her second amended complaint. While in the county jail, Coleman fell on her way out of the shower and broke her ankle. She claimed that the County knew the floors were slippery and violated her constitutional rights by allowing the slippery shower conditions and by failing to properly treat her injuries after she fell. She later filed a second amended complaint suing, among others, the company that provided healthcare services to the jail. On appeal, the court first addressed her Monell claims against the County. It held that she did “not ‘plausibly suggest’ that the conditions of the jail shower violated the Due Process Clause.” It noted that “the risk that shower floors will be slippery exists for all showers—whether located inside or outside a jail’s walls.” And it found that “Coleman’s proposed exacerbating factors—that she had to wear ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unsafe’ flip flops and that other inmates had fallen in the past—do not resemble the types of factors that we have opined might suffice.” The court also concluded that her complaint failed “to tie the purportedly inadequate medical care that she received after her fall to a Hamilton County policy or custom.” Turning to district court’s ruling on the second complaint’s claims against the healthcare company and others, the court held that the complaint showed “that her § 1983 claims accrued on the date of her accident.” While she asserted that “she could not have known of the ‘cause’ of her injuries to trigger the statute of limitations until she learned the identities of the medical personnel who failed to treat her and their affiliation with” the company rather than the County, she was mistaken. She did not need to know the company employees’ names “or their affiliation with that company. It was enough that she knew that they had caused her delayed care.” The court also held that the complaint could not be saved under Rule 15(c)(1) where she could not “show the required error for any of the newly added defendants.” And the court found that she failed to meet her burden to show that she qualified for equitable tolling. Affirmed.