Search & seizure; Motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop; Suppression based on a violation of Miranda v Arizona; Voluntary statements; Inevitable discovery; Vehicle search; The plain-view doctrine; The automobile exception to the warrant requirement; Probable cause; People v Kazmierczak

In these consolidated appeals in which both parties challenged the trial court’s rulings on defendant-Quinzy’s motion to suppress, the court held that the search of her car was completely permissible. Thus, it reversed the trial court’s grant of the motion as to the gun recovered during the traffic stop, affirmed the denial of the motion in all other respects, and remanded. Defendant told the state trooper (P) conducting the stop “that she had no driver’s license, and [P] saw the front-seat passenger trying to put something into the purse at her feet. [P] took defendant into custody, and another law-enforcement officer arrived to assist him.” They eventually seized defendant’s gun and a bag of meth. The court concluded that the gun could not “be suppressed under the Miranda doctrine for several reasons. First, ‘[p]hysical evidence obtained as a result of an unwarned statement remains admissible as long as the statement was voluntary.’” Every pertinent factor here indicated “the statement about the gun defendant made without prompting was ‘voluntary.’” In addition, it “was not the result of any police questioning; she simply volunteered the information about the gun without any prompting. . . . Third, because the police officers on the scene had probable cause to search” her car, her gun “would inevitably have been discovered during the warrantless search of the vehicle that was permissible as a matter of law.” Thus, the trial court erred in suppressing the gun. The court also found no basis to suppress defendant’s statement to the second officer (B) about the gun. “The casual conversation between [B] and defendant preceding Miranda warnings did not constitute interrogation because no ‘questioning’ occurred.” Further, probable cause supported P’s search of the car. While he “had to look closely at the bag to identify it as meth[], at that point he already had a substantial basis to conclude that contraband was inside the vehicle. Specifically, he knew that defendant had no driver’s license, the vehicle contained a stolen license plate, and the passenger had made furtive gestures trying to hide something. . . . Also, because [P] and [B] had probable cause to believe that the plastic bag contained an illegal substance based on the passenger’s furtive gestures and [B’s] training and experience, their search of the area where they located the plastic bag and their search of defendant’s bag were both covered by the automobile exception.”