42 USC § 1983; Qualified immunity; Fabrication of evidence claim; The Fourth Amendment & the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause; Jackson v City of Cleveland; “Causation”; Whether “clearly established law” was violated; Pyle v Kansas; Federal malicious prosecution; Lack of probable cause; Michigan malicious prosecution; Governmental immunity under Michigan law; Odom v Wayne Cnty.; Brady v Maryland claim

[This appeal was from the ED-MI.] The court held that the district court properly denied defendants-police officers (Abdallah and Smith) qualified immunity on plaintiffs-Clark’s and Harrington’s claims that defendants fabricated evidence in plaintiffs’ murder trials. It also upheld the district court’s denial of summary judgment on the federal malicious-prosecution, Michigan malicious-prosecution, and Brady claims. After nearly 20 years in prison, plaintiffs were released and their murder charges were dismissed after an investigation by the county prosecutor’s office concluded they “‘did not receive a fair trial as a result of the conduct of the original lead detective[.]’” They then sued defendants under § 1983, claiming among other things that they violated their right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by introducing fabricated evidence at the jury trials through the testimony of witnesses-S and W. The court rejected defendants’ argument that the district court erred in considering plaintiffs’ fabrication-of-evidence claim as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “rather than as a violation of the right to be free from unlawful seizures under the Fourth Amendment.” It held that this argument was “a nonstarter because we have recognized fabrication-of-evidence claims under” both Amendments. As for the constitutional violation, the district court’s conclusion that there were genuine fact issues as to whether defendants fabricated S’s inculpatory preliminary exam “testimony (which was presented at their trials) rested on the following facts from the record: (1) [S] repeatedly denied knowing anything about the crime; (2) [S] told inconsistent stories; (3)” defendants were aware that Clark had an alibi witness; and (4) they “‘pressured [S] into giving a statement by threatening to take away her children.’” As to W, the district court cited among other facts that “(1) Abdallah interviewed [W] while she was in jail; (2) [he] insinuated that he would help [W] with her case if she testified against Plaintiffs (and arranged for her release without bond); (3) [he] threatened to take away [W’s] children;” and (4) she was suffering from drug withdrawal. The court noted that “even if each fact alone would not support a fabrication claim, the conclusion does not follow that the combination of facts could not support an inference that officers knew the statement they procured was false.” Defendants’ arguments that the law was not clearly established failed where the Supreme Court held that threatening witnesses to commit perjury violated the constitution as early as 1942. Affirmed and remanded.