Eligibility for Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) leave; 29 CFR § 825.110(c)(3); Equitable estoppel; Whether a work stoppage constituted a “strike” under the Public Employment Relations Act (PERA); Alleged FMLA fraud; Unclean hands; Detroit Public Schools Community District (DPSCD); Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)

The court held that defendant-former employer (DPSCD) failed to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff-former employee’s (Bulger) FMLA eligibility. The case arose from DPSCD’s denial of Bulger’s application for a leave of absence under the FMLA and its subsequent termination of his employment. The court found that “Bulger’s evidence that he received compensation during the remote schooling period does not necessarily prove that this time was made up of ‘hours worked or services rendered,’ because he might have been compensated for other reasons.” The court held that the “evidence established a material dispute between the parties as to whether Bulger accrued actual hours worked during the building’s closure.” This conclusion did “not preclude the possibility that defendant could demonstrate the absence of a material question of fact in light of this opinion’s clarification of the applicable principles under the FMLA and FLSA.” The parties also disputed whether the statement in § 825.110(c)(3) as to “the inclusion of hours that teachers work at home applies to his job.” Defendant contended “that this statement does not apply to Bulger because he is not a teacher.” Under the circumstances, the court concluded that “the trial court erred by granting summary disposition for defendant on this ground.” It noted this did “not preclude the possibility that defendant could demonstrate in a renewed summary disposition motion that Bulger fails to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding his hours of service and FMLA eligibility.” Bulger additionally argued “that the trial court erred in accepting defendant’s argument that his work stoppage constituted a strike under PERA.” He contended “that defendant cannot belatedly justify his termination or denial of FMLA leave on the ground that he was striking because defendant failed to initiate the remedial process under MCL 423.202a.” The court noted it was clear from the record “that the alleged strike activity was not a factor in the trial court’s summary-disposition decision. Rather, [it] found that defendant submitted evidence that Bulger did not work 1,250 hours in the year preceding his FMLA request, rendering him ineligible for FMLA leave.” The court held that “if defendant had a legitimate basis for terminating Bulger’s employment on grounds of job abandonment, and that job abandonment was not excusable because it was actually striking, Bulger’s eligibility for FMLA leave would be irrelevant.” It concluded that, on “remand, if defendant proves that Bulger’s work stoppage constituted an illegal strike under PERA, the trial court may dismiss Bulger’s retaliation claim on that basis.” Reversed in part and remanded.