The Public Employment Relations Act (PERA); Unfair labor practice (ULP) claim; MCL 423.210(1)(a) & (c); Adverse treatment of an employee for engaging in PERA-protected activity; International Union, UAW v Sterling Hts; Finding that the charging party was engaged in a “strike” (MCL 423.201(k)); MCL 423.202; MCL 423.202a; Irregularities in the denial of a Family & Medical Leave Act (FMLA) request; Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC)

The court held that MERC did not err in finding that charging party-Bulger’s “work stoppage was not a protected activity, and that respondent’s decision to terminate his employment for absenteeism was not motivated by antiunion animus or hostility toward [his] protected concerted activity.” It further concluded that any error respondent may have made as to his “request for FMLA leave did not equate with a violation of PERA.” Thus, the court found that MERC properly dismissed his ULP claim. Bulger contended “that respondent terminated his employment in violation of MCL 423.210(1)(a). MERC also addressed MCL 423.210(1)(c) as a possible basis for a ULP.” MERC determined that Bulger did not meet his burden of showing antiunion animus. The principal (A) at the school where Bulger had worked “was the only individual with any direct connection to the termination decision who knew that Bulger was involved in the protest activity outside of the school. Bulger’s evidence of [A’s] bias mainly consisted of testimony regarding their confrontation outside the school building and another” employee’s testimony that A “said, ‘[W]e finally got [Bulger], he just got terminated this morning.’ The ALJ’s and MERC’s findings that this evidence was less than convincing are not contrary to the evidence. [A] praised Bulger and described him as a ‘valuable’ employee. A reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [A] found Bulger’s protest disruptive and unnecessary, without also finding that [A] wanted to fire him. A reasonable trier of fact also could conclude that [A] reported Bulger’s absenteeism because it was a duty of his job as principal.” Thus, the court concluded MERC did not err in finding “that Bulger failed to establish a prima facie case that respondent retaliated against him under PERA §§ 10(1)(a) and (c).” It further determined that evidence supported “MERC’s finding that his work stoppage met the” PERA’s definition of striking. Bulger also argued that “respondent adopted the FMLA requirements, and that [its] breach of its own standards demonstrates that it lacked a legitimate basis for terminating him. However, to prove violation of PERA § 10, Bulger still needs to prove that irregularities in respondent’s denial of his FMLA request were motivated by antiunion animus.” He failed to do so. Affirmed.