Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; Reasonable suspicion verses probable cause; Reasonable suspicion for a seizure & investigatory stop; Relief under the plain-error rule

The court concluded “that the trial court correctly identified the seizure as an investigatory stop and correctly assessed its validity for reasonable suspicion.” It also determined “that the trial court correctly found that there was reasonable suspicion supporting the investigatory stop.” Defendant-Poston argued “that the trial court erred by applying the wrong standard when evaluating the validity of the warrantless seizure.” He asserted that it “incorrectly applied the lower reasonable suspicion standard, which applies to investigatory stops, when it should have applied the higher probable cause standard because Poston was arrested, not merely detained.” He claimed Sergeant M arrested him because M “(1) used a ‘strong showing of physical force over’ him when he grabbed Poston, spun him around, pushed him against the car, handcuffed and searched him, and (2) failed to question Poston about his presence at the scene.” His claim failed on the first two prongs of the plain error rule “because an error did not occur, let alone a plain one.” The court held that the “trial court did not plainly err by analyzing Poston’s motion to suppress under a reasonable suspicion standard.” This issue essentially asked whether M’s “conduct elevated this seizure from an investigatory stop to an arrest, which would require a heightened standard.” Although M “asked Poston to get out of the car during the stop, this did not necessarily turn the detainment into an arrest.” On this record, Poston failed to show “that he was arrested rather than detained.” Thus, he did not establish “that the trial court clearly erred in applying the reasonable suspicion standard when considering his motion to suppress.” Having concluded that the “seizure—at least prior to the recovery of the gun—was an investigatory stop subject to reasonable suspicion,” the court turned to Poston’s next issue. He argued “that the trial court erred by finding that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the investigatory stop because [M] failed to articulate how Poston’s conduct constituted potentially criminal behavior, and the totality of the circumstances surrounding the incident did not provide reasonable suspicion supporting the investigatory stop.” The court disagreed, finding the record did “not contain any evidence that [M] lacks credibility. Giving deference to the trial court’s factual determinations,” the court was “not left with a definite and firm conviction that the trial court made a mistake in relying on” M’s testimony. Affirmed.