Involuntary mental health treatment; Due process; Attorney’s failure to meet with respondent within the time limits set by MCL 330.1454(7) & (8); MCL 330.1455(3)(b); Attorney’s failure to file the certification required by MCL 330.1454(9); Failure to inform respondent of her right under MCL 330.1463(1) to an independent clinical evaluation; Ineffective assistance of counsel; “Hearsay data” under MRE 1101(b)(10); “A person requiring treatment” under MCL 330.1401(1)(a) or (c)

The court rejected respondent’s due process, ineffective assistance of counsel, and evidentiary claims, and held that the probate court did not clearly err in finding that she was “a person requiring treatment” under MCL 333.1401(1). Thus, it concluded the probate court did not abuse its discretion in ordering her involuntary hospitalization for mental health treatment. It first considered whether she “was deprived of due process based upon her lawyer’s alleged failure to comply with MCL 330.1454(7) through (9) and MCL 330.1455(3)(b).” The petition for her involuntary hospitalization was filed on 6/19/24, and the second clinical certificate in support of the petition was filed four days later. The hearing on the petition was held on 6/27/24. The record reflected that her lawyer certified on 6/24/24 “that she met and consulted with respondent in person.” Given that this “was more than 24 hours before the [6/27/24] hearing, the requirements in MCL 330.1454(7) were satisfied. Further, because [6/24/24] occurred less than 72 hours after the second clinical certificate was filed . . . the requirements in MCL 330.1454(8) and MCL 330.1455(3)(b) were satisfied.” And given that her “lawyer promptly filed the required certification, no violation of MCL 330.1454(9) occurred. Because no violation of the statute is apparent,” respondent’s due process argument had no merit. “For the same reason, her argument that her lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to comply with the statute” also failed. As to whether she was a person requiring treatment, a doctor (A) diagnosed her “with ‘Bipolar Affective Disorder Manic with Psychotic Symptoms.’ He explained that respondent was manic and grandiose, and that her behaviors during her interaction with the police officer informed his diagnosis. One of the clinician certificates considered by the trial court stated that [she] had a long history of depression and anxiety. Based upon that testimony,” the court concluded that the probate court’s finding that she “had a mental illness was not clearly erroneous.” In addition, A “testified that the events that led to respondent’s involuntary hospitalization, particularly her failure to pull over for the police officer for four miles, were evidence that [she] posed a risk to herself or others.” The court also noted “that a gun was found in respondent’s car on the day of her initial hospitalization.” Affirmed.