Termination under §§ 19b(3)(i) & (j); Child’s best interests; Waived notice & due process issue

The court held that because respondent-mother “waived her due process right to notice in the trial court, she cannot challenge a violation of that right on appeal. Even so, the trial court did not clearly err in finding” §§ (i) & (j) existed. The trial court also did not err in holding that termination was in the child’s (SM) best interests. As to notice, the court acknowledged that the petition to terminate her “parental rights, as filed, did not cite to [§] (i) as a ground for termination. However, any alleged notice issue in this regard is waived.” Respondent “confirmed she received notice of the amended petition, which contained the same factual allegations used as the basis for the termination of respondent’s parental rights to” another child. After moving to add provision § (i) “to the petition, DHHS did not allege any new facts against respondent.” Because she “had full notice of the allegations against her and the opportunity to be heard on those allegations, [her] due-process rights were not violated. The trial court did not clearly err in finding this statutory ground was established by clear and convincing evidence.” Also, the court held that because her “unsuitable living conditions, untreated mental health struggles, and continued contact with her ex-boyfriend would likely have traumatic and harmful effects on SM, the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights was proper under” § (j) was not clearly erroneous. Affirmed.