Motion to enforce a consent judgment; Whether the consent judgment’s terms prohibited the appeal; “Arising from”; Restrictions imposed on an easement over state land; The Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Act; Applicability of MCL 324.2123, 324.2123a, 324.2124, & 324.2128; Kyser v Kasson Twp; Whether the consent judgment was fully integrated

The court held that the Court of Claims (COC) erred in “reading additional terms into the consent judgment” (CJ) entered into by the parties. Thus, it reversed the COC’s decision denying plaintiff-Prose’s motion to enforce the CJ entered into with defendant-DNR, and remanded. Plaintiff owns “five lots on a peninsula commonly known as Treasure Island. The DNR owns and controls the” rest of the land. In resolving prior lawsuits, he “agreed to pay the DNR $295,000 for bridge construction and an easement over portions of” roads that lead to his property, as well as administrative costs. The CJ provided that the easement was “to be formalized after entry of the judgment.” The parties unsuccessfully “engaged in discussions to draft the terms of the easement” for nearly two years. Prose moved to enforce the CJ, arguing its “terms unambiguously required the DNR to grant him an easement without restrictions on his ability to divide or sell his property, which consists of five buildable lots. The DNR also moved to enforce the” CJ. The COC denied Prose’s motion and granted the DNR’s motion. On appeal, the court initially addressed the DNR’s claim that the CJ’s terms prohibited this appeal. It noted that “Prose moved to enforce, but did not challenge the validity of, the” CJ. As to the merits, it found that “the condition the DNR seeks to impose on the easement he purchased—limiting easement access in the event of property subdivision, does not appear in the” CJ’s terms. Further, the statutes cited by the DNR did not apply to the easement. “Prose did not apply for an easement under the conditions specified in MCL 324.2123a, nor was he granted an easement pursuant to any other portions of subpart 8 or the prior statute referenced in MCL 324.2128.” And while the COC cited Kyser, that case “does not hold that the DNR cannot grant an easement over state lands without including subdivision conditions under MCL 324.2123a or” 324.2128. The court held that the COC erred in ruling that the easement did “‘not attach to any of plaintiff’s parcels subsequently sold or transferred to third parties absent compliance with statutory requirements by the purchasers and DNR approval.’” It also erred in deciding “that the DNR policy of easement termination upon subdivision of the property was implicitly incorporated into the” CJ. But the court noted its ruling did “not foreclose the DNR’s (or Prose’s) ability to negotiate the terms or conditions of the easement granted in the” CJ, as he asserted.