Motion to suppress evidence; Probable cause; Good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule

The court concluded that the “search warrant was supported by probable cause to the extent that it referenced firearms and related objects, and the trial court erred by concluding otherwise. However, in any event, the trial court correctly concluded the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies, so the evidence at issue need not be suppressed.” Defendant was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon and felony-firearm. He argued “that, while the trial court properly determined that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, it erred by determining that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.” The court disagreed with both arguments. Ultimately, the question before the court was “whether a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause.” In other words, the court “must determine whether the search-warrant affidavit reflects sufficient facts indicating probable cause that the items to be searched for and seized—the firearms and related objects—were evidence of a crime.” The court noted that the “trial court found there was no probable cause supporting the search for and seizure of the firearms and related objects because the affidavit did not explain ‘the specific crime’ that ‘led the officers to be able to collect the evidence.’” Defendant maintained “that the trial court’s determination was correct because there was no allegation that he ‘possessed, or used, weapons illegally during either the domestic violence or resisting and obstructing offenses.’ However, based on a plain reading of the affidavit, and affording the appropriate deference to the issuing judge,” the court disagreed. “The affidavit characterized the incident as defendant ‘barricading himself into the home with a firearm.’ These facts supply adequate context connecting the firearms and related objects to be searched for and seized with [his] suspected criminal behavior. That is, a common-sense reading of the affidavit shows a connection between the weapons possessed by [him] and what Detective [L] described to be a barricaded gunman situation.” The court found that while defendant, and the dissent, focused “on the lack of a connection between the firearms and the initially charged crimes of domestic assault and resisting and obstructing, as the prosecution points out, the affidavit contained facts showing a fair probability that evidence of a crime, such as unlawful imprisonment or assault, was committed with a firearm in the home.” The court concluded that “a reasonably cautious person could have concluded that there was a substantial basis for the finding of probable cause.” Thus, it held that “the trial court erred by invalidating the search warrant with respect to the searched-for and seized firearms and related objects.” Alternatively, it held that “even if the search warrant was invalid to that extent, we agree with the trial court that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies.” Thus, the court determined that “based on defendant’s display of a firearm and subsequent confirmation that there were multiple firearms in the home, the affidavit was not so lacking as to render belief in it wholly unreasonable. Therefore, the trial court properly determined that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies and properly denied [his] motion to suppress evidence.” Affirmed.