Sentencing; Scoring of OV 10 (exploitation of a vulnerable victim); Predatory conduct; MCL 777.40(1)(a); MCL 777.40(3)(a); People v Cannon; Scoring of OV 19 (interference with the administration of justice); MCL 777.49(c); People v Hershey; Hiding from police; People v Smith

The court held that the trial court did not err in scoring OVs 10 and 19. Defendant was convicted of CSC III and human trafficking for recruiting the victim, EC, to engage in prostitution after they began dating. The trial court resentenced him to concurrent terms of 58 months to 15 years for the former and 36 months to 10 years for the latter. On appeal, the court rejected defendant’s argument that he was entitled to resentencing because the trial court erred in scoring OVs 10 and 19. As to OV 10, it noted he “spent months cultivating a complicated sexual relationship with EC in which he manipulated her into prostitution and then controlled the money that she earned. On the day of the sexual assault that formed the basis for” his CSC III conviction, EC called him “to ask for money that she needed for her young child. Defendant told her that he would give her the money if she came to his motel room. EC arrived, and defendant told her that he wanted to have sex.” When she said no, he “forced her onto the bed, put his hand around her throat, and sexually assaulted her. She left when he was in the bathroom, without the money that he had promised.” The trial court properly found that evidence of his “preexisting relationship with EC and his preoffense conduct on the date of the incident supported a 15-point assessment for” CSC III. As to OV 19, the trial court properly “assessed 10 points for OV 19 on the basis that defendant hid in the shower of his motel room ‘during a serious investigation’ when he knew that ‘the police were on the other side of that bathroom door’ and that police had come to the room to look for” him. He claimed he was not hiding from police, but instead “hiding from EC’s prostitution client, who had just left.” He also contended “his conduct of remaining in the shower while police were in his motel room did not constitute an attempt to interfere with the administration of justice because he had a constitutional right to remain silent.” However, there was evidence he “left the bathroom after the prostitution client exited the hotel room and, when the police arrived a short time later, [he] returned to the bathroom to hide in the shower.” Hiding from the police “‘constitute[s] an interference with the administration of justice because it [is] done for the purpose of hindering or hampering the police investigation.’” Affirmed.